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HEY, THE SUN IS HOT AND THE WATER'S FINE: WHY NOT 
STRIP OFF THAT LIEN? 
Lawrence Ponorojf 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, the author maintains that avoidance of wholly unsecured 
liens ("strip off") in chapter 7 is permissible and desirable notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's controversial 1992 decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, which 
refused to permit avoidance of the unsecured portion of a partially secured 
lien ("strip down"). The argument flows from a broader analysis of the proper 
characterization of secured claims in bankruptcy. Specifically, contrary to the 
state law ideation of "secured" that focuses on the identity of the claimant, the 
author urges that in bankruptcy the concept of "secured" should focus on that 
creditor's claim or claims as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. He argues not 
only that bankruptcy courts have the authority to develop a uniform federal 
rule in this area, but that to do so would limit Dewsnup to its narrowest 
possible construction, and perhaps provide the impetus for reexamination of a 
decision that is out-of-step with core bankruptcy policy and the Court's own 
bankruptcy jurisprudence. 
Samuel M. Fetgly Chair in Commercial Law, The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of 
Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1990's witnessed a vigorous debate over the efficiency of secured 
credie and the distributive impact of the "full priority" rule for secured 
creditors enshrined, following some debate, 2 in the revision of Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")? The new century saw an ebbing of the 
controversy; most likely a consequence of the dramatic shift in commercial 
financing patterns from conventional asset-based lending to various forms of 
securitization.4 The squabble, however, over the potential moral hazard created 
1 While most of the activity occurred in the 1990's, the debate itself dates back to at least 1979. See 
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE 
L.J. 1143 (1979). Other important contributions along the way include: Robert E. Scott, The Truth About 
Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1436 (1997): Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy 
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996): John Hudson, The Case 
Against Secured Lending, 15 lNT'L REv. L. & ECON. 47 (1995): Lyun M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's 
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994): Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. 
REv. 1051 (1984): Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 
10J.LEGALSTUD. I (1981). 
2 In 1996, then-Professor (now Senator) Elizabeth Warren submitted a proposal to the American Law 
Institute and the Drafting Committee working on the revision of Article 9 providing for a carve-out of 20% 
%%percent of a prior perfected secured creditor's collateral in order to benefit tort claimants, employees, 
environmental-pollution claimants and other so-called "non-adjusting" (involuntary) creditors. See Kenneth N. 
Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 
1466, 1476-77 (1997): Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full 
Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1379 (1997): William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured 
Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1511 
(1997) (questioning the distributive fairness of rules that afford full priority to secured creditors). While the 
Warren proposal created a great deal of academic angst, the Drafting Committee ignored it, sharing the attitude 
of Professor White insofar as its necessity was concerned. See James J. White, The Slippery Slope to 
Bankruptcy: Should Some Claimants Get a 'Carve-out' From Secured Credit?, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 
1998, at 33. 
3 Revised Article 9 was approved by its sponsoring agencies, the American Law Institute and the 
National Commission on Uniform State Laws, in 1998, but with a delayed effective date of July I, 2001, in 
order to allow adequate time for enactment by the states. U.C.C. § 9-701 (2001). 
4 The use of limited-liability special-purpose entities to isolate assets has become ubiquitous in 
commercial finance. In 200 I, Professor Lupica observed that, "[ s ]ince the first public asset -backed security 
issuance, the volume of ABS [asset-backed securities] issuances has grown from $1 billion in 1985 to $185 
billion in 1999. There are over $2.5 trillion asset-backed securities currently outstanding, and it has been 
estimated that a typical business day sees $700 million in new ABS issuances." Lois R. Lupica, Revised 
Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR.lNST. L. REv. 287,291-92 
(2001). This trend only continued after 2001 facilitated by the revision of Article 9, an important goal of which 
was to expand protection for and facilitate securitization transactions. See also Edward J. Janger, The Death of 
Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1759, 1760-61 (2004) (citing recently-adopted state statutes that 
"gerrymander state property law to provide a safe harbor for securitization transactions" and an effective opt-
out from Article 9). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 
74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947 (1999). The Enron debacle and the financial crisis in 2008 have combined to, if not 
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by the effective judgment proofing of debtors through all-encompassing 
security interests5 continues unresolved to date.6 
The issue is exacerbated in the context of a bankruptcy case where the 
unique rehabilitative fresh start and equality policies of the federal bankruptcy 
law enter into the fray, policies that find doctrinal instantiation in certain key 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code").7 Chief among these is § 506(a) 
of the Code, which calls for the bifurcation of partially secured 
("undersecured") claims into two parts: (1) a secured claim equal to the value 
of the collateral, and (2) an unsecured claim for the balance of the debt 
supporting the claim. 8 This distinction, which ties the concept of "secured 
claim" to specific economic value, has no corollary under state law. 9 Largely, 
it derives from the necessity in bankruptcy to cleave a wide chasm between the 
debtor's pre- and postpetition lives. 10 Whether in liquidation or reorganization 
abate the trend somewhat, at least attract greater regulatory scrutiny. See Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: 
Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 859 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1539 (2004); cf Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining 
Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1229 (2012) (distinguishing between "true" securitization transactions and 
other forms of structured financing). 
5 See generally Lyun M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. I (1996). 
6 Two more contemporary forays into the arena include: Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to 
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DuKE L.J. 1037 (2008) 
(finding that firms with high tort risk do not issue more secured debt than other firms, negating the 
redistribution theory of secured credit); Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors' Rights, 118 
YALE L.J. 806 (2009) (calling for the subordination of secured creditor deficiency claims in order to produce 
"symmetry" in the portioning of the debtor's assets). Also worth examining is a comparative law piece that 
juxtaposes the U.S. system, which affords the security interest priority over virtually all creditors, with the 
English system, which prescribes a "carve-out" for certain types of claims and expenses. Lyun M. LoPucki, 
Arvin I. Abraham & Bernd P. Delahaye, Optimizing English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1785 (2013). 
7 The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1530 
(2012), amended by Pub. L. No. 112-106 (2012). It was enacted on November 6, 1978 as the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, and governs all cases filed on or after October I, 
1979. In this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references to the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code" 
are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended through January I, 2013. 
The clearest examples of provisions that promote these goals are the provisions for cramdown of the 
claims of nonconsenting creditors in chapters 11, 12, and 13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2), 1222(b)(2), 
1322(b)(2) (2012). In chapter 7, the discharge injunction of§ 524(d), the protection of exempt assets in§ 522, 
and the prohibitions on discrimination based on the bankruptcy filing in § 525, loom large. 
8 II U.S.C. § 506(a). 
9 See Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Lawyers [and 
laypersons] often think of any claim for repayment of a mortgage loan as a 'secured claim' whether or not the 
mortgagee could actually realize anything at a foreclosure sale."). 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 247-50,266-67. 
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mode, bankruptcy at its core entails a fundamental and mandatory realignment 
of existing contractual and property relationships and obligations so as to 
achieve the debtor's fresh start or rehabilitation, as the case may be.n On the 
face of it, then, it would seem that being "secured" for bankruptcy purposes 
means simply the right to a priority claim in the present value (net of prior 
liens) of the creditor's collateral as of the date of filing-no more and no less.12 
The controversy and disagreement, however, over how to properly 
conceptualize security interests in bankruptcy demonstrates that, in fact, 
understanding the ontological meaning of and entailments associated with a 
"secured claim" has been anything but simple. 
In 1992 the Supreme Court of the United States set the stage for the current 
debacle with its controversial decision in Dewsnup v. Timm. 13 The narrow 
holding of the case was that "strip down"14 of an undersecured claim is not 
permitted under§ 506(d) in a chapter 7 case.15 The broader implications of the 
holding were that, in ways yet unarticulated, being secured in bankruptcy 
might entail rights beyond simply the right to the property pledged to secure 
the claim, or its value. In 1997, Professor Knippenberg and I published a law 
review article rather critical of the Court's decision in Dewsnup16 based 
primarily on our view of a security interest as representing a claim to property, 
11 The importance of this "closing of the books" with regard to all prebankruptcy transactions, regardless 
of character, is reflected in the Code's broad definition of what constitutes a "claim" in § 101(5) and in the 
procedures in § 502(c) for estimating claims, the precise determination of which might unduly delay the 
administration of the case. 
12 This view is consistent with a prediction expressed at the birth of the Code. See Peter F. Coogan, 
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1028-30 (1978) (indicating that the Code had 
moved away from an approach that viewed the secured party's interest as "property rights" to one that 
recognized the interest as a prior claim against specific assets). Unfortunately, Professor Coogan's prediction 
proved a bit too optimistic, as the property-based understanding of security has become ensconced in Revised 
Article 9. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Having One's Property and Eating It Too: When 
the Article 9 Security Interest Becomes a Nuisance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 373, 379-84 (2006); Steven L. 
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices 
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2047-53 (1994) (Professors Harris and Mooney were the reporters to the 
Article 9 revision process). 
13 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
14 
"Strip down" occurs when an undersecured lien is bifurcated and the unsecured portion is avoided and 
should be distinguished from "strip off," which entails avoiding a lien that is unsupported by any collateral 
value. See generally Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36,37 n.2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). 
15 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. 
16 In this, we were hardly alone. For a representative sample of cases and commentary critical of 
Dewsnup, see Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1274 n.l (lOth Cir. 2012). 
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but not an indefeasible right in property. 17 In attempting to demonstrate the 
futility of the holding in Dewsnup, we stated that by resorting to a device 
known as "chapter 20"18 a debtor could do in two steps what Dewsnup now 
forbids doing in one; namely, strip down an undersecured lien, at least as 
against nonresidential real property. 19 
Later that same year, Judge Robert D. Martin, in a case titled In re 
Kirchner,20 faced with a chapter 20 scenario similar, but by no means identical, 
to the one Professor Knippenberg and I hypothesized, 21 opined: "How the 
chapter 7 discharge affects what can be done in a subsequent chapter 13 case is 
not as obvious to me as it was to Professors Ponoroff and Knippenberg."22 
Sixteen years after that, in Branigan v. Davis,23 the U.S. Fourth Circuit faced 
an attempt by debtors to "strip off' wholly underwater liens against their 
personal residences in a chapter 20 case. In a two-to-one decision, the court 
held that lien stripping in chapter 20 is permissible notwithstanding: (1) the 
fact that it created an "end run" around Dewsnup, and (2) the amendments to 
chapter 13 accomplished under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCP A")24 intended to tip "the 
bankruptcy scales back in the direction of creditors."25 
17 Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force: 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2234 (1997). 
18 There is, of course, no "chapter 20" in the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the term refers to the successive 
filing of a chapter 7 bankruptcy to discharge personal liability on debt and then a chapter 13 in order to 
restructure secured debt or deal with non-dischargeable debt. See also infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
19 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2299. Our point was that a debtor might still strip down an 
undersecured lien by first filing a chapter 7 case to discharge personal liability, and then file a chapter 13 
petition to re-impose the stay and satisfy the claim by proposing under § 1325(b)(5) a plan in which the 
creditor would receive payments equal to the present value of the secured portion of its claim. !d. 
20 In re Kirchner, 216 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1997). 
21 In our hypothetical, we acknowledged that the chapter 20 technique for stripping down an 
undersecured lien would not include circumstances where the claim was secured by a lien on property that was 
the debtor's principal residence. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2299 n.251. 
22 In light of the fact that Judge Martin is a long-serving, smart, conscientious judge, with a stellar 
reputation on the bench (not to mention a friend), I felt a bit unnerved on first reading this statement. 
23 Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2013). 
24 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
BAPCPA became fully effective for cases filed on or after Oct. 17,2005. 
25 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011). The late Senator Paul Wellstone, the 
lone senator to vote against the bill, summed up the view of many in the bankruptcy field when he offered this 
comment with respect to an earlier iteration of the bill that eventually was passed as BAPCP A. 
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In short, notwithstanding the passage of more than 16 years, the spilling of 
much ink on the subject, and a comprehensive overhaul of the federal 
bankruptcy law, we have gone exactly nowhere in advancing our collective 
understanding of what it means to be "secured" in bankruptcy. So, it seems 
timely to tilt yet once more at that windmill where divergent state and federal 
law schema have uncomfortably co-existed for so long. I begin this redux with 
a brief overview of the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to this 
topic, and then consider some of the questions that remained unanswered after 
those cases, including the dilemma faced by Judge Martin in Kirchner and the 
differing treatment to be accorded to strip off as opposed to strip down?6 Next, 
I tum to a detailed discussion of the Branigan case and its implications. 
Following that, I attempt to pull together some of the disparate threads by 
focusing, ironically, on the technique employed by Congress under BAPCPA 
to expand the scope of non-modifiable claims in chapter 13. I then propose 
what I submit represents a way to conceive of security in bankruptcy, as 
distinct from state law, that fairly balances the contractual entitlements of 
secured creditors with the specific equality and rehabilitation objectives 
implicated in any bankruptcy proceeding. Lastly, relying on recent scholarship 
analyzing the role of the bankruptcy courts in the development of the law, I 
conclude that the courts inherently possess the means to allow strip off in 
chapter 7, and, in so doing, to confine the Court's definition of "secured claim" 
in Dewsnup to its narrowest (and least damaging) possible sphere of operation. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT TRILOGY (OR HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE 
TODAY) 
A. Dewsnup 
In Dewsnup, the chapter 7 debtors owed $120,000 on land worth only 
$39,000?7 The debtors sought to keep the land by bifurcating the undersecured 
claim under § 506(a) and then relying on what appeared to be the plain 
You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy judge that supports this legislation. You are hard 
pressed to find a bankruptcy law professor, a bankruptcy expert of any kind, anywhere, any place 
in the U.S.A. that backs this bill. This bill was written for the lender. It is that simple. 
147 CONG. REc. 13129, 13140 (2001) (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone). 
26 See supra note 14. 
27 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,413 (1992). 
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language of§ 506(d)28 to void ("strip down") the portion of the lien ($81,000) 
unsupported by the land's value.29 The Court, in Justice Blackmun's majority 
decision, found that the relationship between subsections (a) and (d) of§ 506, 
as well as their relationship with other parts of the Code, was sufficiently 
ambiguous30 to allow the Court to overlook its own rules of statutory 
construction regarding the meaning to be attached to identical terms as used in 
different parts of a statute?1 Thus freed to make its own interpretation of 
§ 506, the Court concluded that the better reading of the phrase "allowed 
secured claim," as used in § 506(d), was to assign it a different meaning from 
the defined meaning of the identical phrase in § 506(a); i.e., that portion of the 
total claim that is supported by value in the collateral.32 Specifically, Justice 
Blackmun concluded that the phrase "allowed secured claim" in § 506(d) 
"should be read term-by-term" so as to refer only to a claim that is both "not 
allowed" and "not secured."33 In this case, because the creditors' claim had 
been allowed under § 502, and was secured,34 this construction of § 506(d) 
meant that the lien could not be stripped down. 
It becomes important later to pay some attention to the rationales that the 
majority opinion offered in support of its holding that strip down of an 
undersecured claim is not permitted in chapter 7. First, the Court opined that a 
different conclusion would, of necessity, "freeze the creditor's security interest 
at the judicial valuation," and, thus, deprive the creditor of the any later 
appreciation in the property. 35 Second, noting the doctrine that holds the Code 
28 Section 506(d) provides that: "To the extent that a lien secured a claim against the debtor that is not an 
allowed secured claim, such lien is void .... " II U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012). 
29 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413. For an extensive review of the facts of the case and its treatment in the 
lower courts, see Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, I J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513 (1992). 
30 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17. 
31 Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) ("[I]dentical words used in different parts of [a statute] 
are [presumed] to have the same meaning."). It is also notable that the "ambiguity" seems, as pointed out by 
the dissent, based merely on the fact that the litigants ascribed different meanings to the statute. Dewsnup, 502 
U.S. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying note 41. 
32 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. 
33 !d. (referring to respondents' arguments at 415). Justice Blackmun did acknowledge that if "writing on 
a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words 'allowed secured claim' must take 
the same meaning in§ 506(d) as in§ 506(a)." !d. 
34 In this context, "secured" is being used in the state law sense, of the debt being supported by an 
interest in property of the debtor, unrelated to value (if any) artificially prescribed by the Code in§ 506(a). See 
infra note 222. 
35 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 ("Any increase over the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy 
rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other 
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should be read not to change pre-Code practices without some indication in the 
legislative history,36 the Court pointed to the pre-Code principles that liens 
passed through bankruptcy unaffected, and that debtors were only permitted to 
reduce an unwilling creditor's lien by either paying it in full or filing for 
reorganization?7 Ironically, the majority missed the one obvious opportunity to 
mitigate its butchery of the usual canons of statutory interpretation in 
construing the language of § 506(d)?8 That is, the debtors' interpretation of 
§ 506(d) could be seen as rendering the redemption provision in § 722 largely 
superfluous,39 in contravention of the general judicial reluctance to avoid 
construing a statute in a manner that produces that result.40 
The majority opinion drew a splenetic dissent from Justice Scalia for 
ignoring the "normal and sensible principle that a term (and especially an 
artfully defined term such as 'allowed secured claim') bears the same meaning 
throughout the statute."41 Among other salvos leveled at the majority 
unsecured creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgagor-
mortgagee bargain."). 
36 !d. at 419. The pre-Code practices doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court in a string of 
cases dating back to Mid/antic Nat'! Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986), which 
refused to hold that the power of abandonment under§ 554(a) is no longer subject to certain judicially-created 
exceptions developed under the prior bankruptcy law. 
37 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418. The problem, however, as Professor Howard has shown, is that the Court's 
understanding of the pre-Code practice in relation to both lien stripping and the inviolability of liens was 
incorrect. See Howard, supra note 29, at 526-30; see also infra note 225. 
38 See infra text accompanying note 161. 
39 That is because, under the debtor's interpretation of § 506(d), liens securing both personal and real 
property collateral could be stripped. That result is more expansive than the collateral-tangible personalty 
used for consumer purposes-subject to redemption under § 722 for the secured portion of the lender's claim 
as determined under§ 506(a). The point was not lost on the dissent. See infra note 41. 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Jicarillo Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011) (quoting Mackey v. 
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)) ("As our cases have noted in the past, we 
are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion 
of that same law."); see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting that the Code must, when 
possible, be interpreted such that "equivalent words have equivalent meaning"); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way 
each time it appears."). 
41 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is important to bear in mind that, four years 
earlier, Justice Scalia authored the Court's most recent attempt to define the character of secured claims in 
bankruptcy. See United Savs. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Inc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988). 
In that case, an undersecured creditor with a deed of trust on the debtor's apartment complex sought relief 
from stay on the ground that its interest lacked adequate protection as required by § 362(d)(l). !d. at 368. 
Specifically, the creditor urged that even if the property were not declining in value, it was losing the 
opportunity (as it surely was) to reinvest the value of the property; a right with unquestioned economic value 
that is also part of the creditor's bargain with the debtor. !d. at 370-71. The Court rejected the argument, 
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opinion,42 the dissent also derided the Court's deference to "pre-[C]ode 
behavior" as inappropriate where, as here, the specific language of the statute 
clearly revealed Congress's intent as to the matter.43 Noting that the majority 
opinion's approach to construing the statute was the "methodological 
antithesis" of the approach taken by the Court just three years earlier in a case 
involving the interpretation of yet another subsection of§ 506,44 Justice Scalia 
closed with a sardonic expression of sympathy for the courts of appeal that 
would be forced now to speculate on the approach to statutory construction the 
Court would choose next in connection with its interpretation of the Code.45 
B. Johnson 
A year prior to Dewsnup, the Court decided another case that would also 
end up influencing the treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy. In Johnson 
v. Home State Bank, the Court implicitly placed its imprimatur on a practice 
that had been in some doubt; that is, rescheduling in chapter 13 of a debt as to 
which personal liability had been discharged in an earlier chapter 7.46 In 
Johnson, the mortgage lender opposed use of the "chapter 20" technique by 
urging that once the debtor's personal liability on the obligation had been 
discharged, the remaining lien no longer represented a "claim," and therefore, 
holding that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to what would amount to postpetition income to 
compensate for the delay associated with realizing on its collateral. !d. at 373. To hold otherwise, the Court 
observed, would allow one group of creditors (undersecured) to realize on unencumbered assets at the expense 
of another group of creditors (unsecured) contrary to the Code's allocation of the costs of bankruptcy. !d. 
Clearly, at its essence, Timbers stood for the proposition that, for bankruptcy purposes, a secured creditor's 
claim represents an entitlement to the value of its collateral as of the time of filing and no more. See id. 
Dewsnup, by contrast, seems to accord a secured claim rights in post-filing appreciation. Thus, Justice Scalia's 
dissent in Dewsnup was demanded by his opinion in Timbers, though he did not expressly make that 
connection. 
42 For instance, the dissent suggested that the "inconsistency" that § 722 (the redemption provision) 
would supposedly create, if avoidance were permitted under § 506(d), was "greatly overstated," because 
§ 506(d) is not a redemption provision. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
43 !d. at 433. The dissent also pointed to the absence of any prior Bankruptcy Act provision or practice 
for the interpretation of§ 506(d) that would invalidate across the board liens securing disallowed claims. !d. at 
434. 
44 !d. at 435. That case was United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), concerning the 
entitlement under § 506(b) of postpetition interest to oversecured creditors whose liens are nonconsensual. 
45 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 435 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also noted: "The greater and more 
enduring damage of today's opinion consists in its destruction of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and 
elsewhere. By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles of statutory construction, it renders 
those principles less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable." !d. 
46 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
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could not be restructured in a chapter 13 plan.47 The Court disagreed, 
reasoning that the mortgagee still had a "right to payment" through foreclosure 
of the mortgaged property, and thus, possessed a "claim" within the meaning 
of § 101(5).48 The Court also refused to hold that the serial filing was per se 
invalid, concluding instead that each case must stand or fall on its own under 
the crucible of good faith.49 
Surely unbeknownst at the time, the Court's ruling in Johnson, combined 
with the anti-modification stipulation in § 1322(b)(2), set the stage for what 
later would prove to be the principal battleground between the bankruptcy 
system's foundational pro rata rule and the traditional hierarchical norms of 
secured credit. At the time, however, Johnson could be seen as perfectly 
consistent with Congress's decision in the 1978 Code to give the term "claim" 
the "broadest possible definition" in order enhance the scope of debtor relief in 
bankruptcy beyond what had been the practice under the prior law.50 
C. Nobelman 
The final Supreme Court case of import for current purposes, Nobelman v. 
American Savings Bank, arose just a year after Dewsnup and also addressed the 
issue of strip down of an undersecured lien, but this time in chapter 13.51 The 
debtors had unsuccessfully argued below that the antimodification language of 
§ 1322(b)(2), pertammg to claims secured by the debtors' principal 
residence,52 applied only to the postbifurcation secured claim.53 In this case, 
47 /d.at81. 
48 !d. at 84 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012)). The Court relied on§ 524(a)(l), which it referred to as 
"codifying" the rule established more than a century earlier in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), that the 
discharge only extinguishes the personal liability of the debtor and does not affect an action against the debtor 
in rem. !d. at 83-85. 
49 !d. at 87-88. On the actual issue of good faith (and, for that matter, feasibility under § 1325(a)(6)), 
which the bankruptcy court had found to be satisfied, the Court declined to rule inasmuch as both the district 
court and the court of appeals had chosen to resolve the case on the question of whether the bank's interest was 
a "claim" for purposes of the debtor's chapter 13 plan. Thus, the ultimate disposition was to reverse and 
remand. !d. at 88. 
50 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977); see also infra notes 248-
249 and accompanying text. 
51 Nobelman v. Am. Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
52 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (allowing a plan, subject to§§ 1322(a) and (c), to "modify the rights of holders 
of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's 
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of 
claims"). 
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that amount was $23,500, or roughly $47,855 less than the amount owed under 
the terms of the mortgage loan.54 Clearing up a split in the circuits, the 
Supreme Court rejected the debtors' argument.55 Significantly, though, the 
Court agreed with the premise that it is necessary to "look first to 506(a) to 
determine" if the lender has a secured claim at all. 56 Beyond that, however, the 
Court noted that § 1322(b )(2) focuses on "rights," rather than "claims."57 Thus, 
the fact that the lender had only a $23,500 "secured claim" under§ 506(a) did 
not mean that its rights as the holder of such a claim were necessarily limited 
to that amount.58 Rather, the Court opined that, as determined under state law, 
the lender's "rights" include the right to retain the lien until the debt is paid off, 
the right to accelerate the loan upon default, and the right to recover any 
deficiency still outstanding after foreclosure.59 Those are rights that, the Court 
concluded, bankruptcy might modify to an extent, but that ultimately may not 
be abrogated because of§ 1322(b)(2)'s prohibition on modification.60 
The debtor in Nobelman had urged the Court to apply the "last antecedent 
rule"61 in construing § 1322(b )(2), which is to say that the "other than" 
language in the statute should be interpreted as modifying the phrase "secured 
53 Nobleman v. Am. Savs. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1992). The debtors' 
name, "Nobelman," was misspelled in the caption of the Fifth Circuit case and throughout that opinion. 
54 In chapter 13, strip down is accomplished under § 1322(b )(2), except as to home mortgage loans, 
making§ 506(d), and thus the analysis in Dewsnup, inapposite in this case. See, e.g., Bartee v. Tara Colony 
Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 291 n.21 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Dewsnup is 
inapplicable to the bankruptcy reorganization chapters); see also infra notes 99, 112 and accompanying text. 
55 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 327-29. 
56 !d. at 328-29. This is precisely the point that the majority in Dewsnup ignored; i.e., the need to use 
§ 506(a) to determine the status of the claim as secured or unsecured. 
57 !d. Justice Thomas also explained that Congress consciously chose the unqualified term "claim" rather 
than the term of art "secured claim" when crafting the antimodification provision in § 1322(b )(2). !d. Because 
"claim" is broadly defined under the Code, the conclusion to be drawn from its use is clear. Essentially, 
Congress employed the broader term specifically to capture the entire claim-including both its secured and 
unsecured portions-put forward by the bank. Thus, the reasoning goes that it is the "rights of a holder" of a 
claim secured by the debtor's residence, and not the mortgagee's secured claim in the debtor's residence, that 
may not be modified. !d. at 33(}-31. 
58 !d. at 324. 
59 !d. at 329 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)) ("In the absence of a controlling 
federal rule, we generally assume that Congress has 'left the determination of property rights in the assets of a 
bankrupt's estate to state law,' since such '[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law."'); see also 
infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. 
60 !d. at 329. This would include the automatic stay against enforcement under § 362(a) and the right to 
cure a prepetition default under § 1322(b )(5). 
61 See generally Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent 
in the United States Supreme Court, 39 Sw. U. L. REv. 325 (2009). 
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claim," with the result that only the portion of the mortgagee's debt supported 
by value would be immune from modification. 62 The Court conceded that this 
reading was plausible, but not required. 63 Pointing out that the phrase used in 
the statute is "claim secured ... by," rather than the term of art for § 506(a) 
purposes, "secured claim," the Court decided that the better reading was to 
construe the term "claim" as broad enough for purposes of the exemption from 
modification to include the lender's entire claim, the unsecured as well as the 
d . 64 secure portiOn. 
II. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
A. Strip Down in Chapters 13 and 20 
Despite some early uncertainty about the applicability of Dewsnup beyond 
chapter 7,65 -a truly frightening possibility-a consensus quickly emerged that 
strip down remained available in all forms of reorganization proceedings for 
undersecured claims not statutorily protected from modification, such as by 
§ 1322(b)(2) in chapter 13 cases.66 The rationale for this conclusion, beyond 
being necessary to save rehabilitation from being consigned to oblivion, was 
the existence of specific cramdown provisions in each of the reorganization 
chapters.67 This obviates the need in those cases to rely on § 506(d) for strip 
down authority and, when coupled with the language in Justice Blackmun's 
opinion limiting the reach of the holding in Dewsnup,68 provides a more than 
62 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330. 
63 !d. at 331. 
64 !d. 
65 See, e.g., Blue Pac. Car Wash, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty. (In re Blue Pac. Car Wash, Inc.), 150 B.R. 434 
(W.D. Wis. 1992). 
66 See, e.g., Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1128-29 (lOth Cir. 1994) (holding strip down of liens on 
real property is permitted in chapter 11); Sapos v. Provident Ins!. of Sav., 967 F.2d 918, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(involving strip down in chapter 13); Okla. ex rel. Comm'rs of the Land Office v. Crook (In re Crook), 966 
F.2d 539, 539 & n.l (lOth Cir. 1992) (involving a chapter 12 case); see also Margaret Howard, Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 313,319-20 (1994) (explaining why 
Dewsnup has little relevance in rehabilitative proceedings); supra note 54. The types of claims statutorily 
immune from modification were expanded in 2005. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
67 In chapter 11, for instance, under § 1141 (b), confirmation of a plan vests all estate property in the 
debtor, and, thereafter, the property is held free of all liens except those provided for in the plan. See In re 
Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a lien not provided for in the plan was extinguished 
upon confirmation); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b), 1322(b) (2012). 
68 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1992) ("[W]e express no opinion as to whether the words 
'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."). The Court also 
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sufficient justification for preserving the debtor's ability to strip down 
undersecured claims in reorganization proceedings to the value of the 
underlying collateral. 69 
As noted earlier, in In re Kirchner, Judge Martin described the difficulty in 
harmonizing these three Supreme Court cases in the context of a chapter 20 
case.
70 In the case before him, the debtors sought to sell their principal 
residence under their chapter 13 plan and pay the lender the agreed-upon value 
of the property from the sales proceeds. 71 Contrary to the result of a 
hypothetical that Professor Knippenberg and I had posed,72 Judge Martin 
concluded that the "rights" enjoyed by a mortgagee, and protected from 
modification by § 1322(b )(2), included the right to payment of the full amount 
of the underlying debt owed, as a condition to the release of its lien.73 
Consistent with Johnson, this would be true even after the debtor has received 
a discharge of personal liability. 74 Thus, the court upheld the lender's objection 
to confirmation of the debtors' plan. 75 
Although Judge Martin acknowledged that the lender had no discernible or 
genuine economic motive for not agreeing to release its lien in return for the 
proceeds from the sale of the property, and indeed might actually benefit/6 he 
stated that its holding was limited to the facts presented and that it would "allow other facts to await their legal 
resolution on another day." !d. at 416. 
69 As will be seen, thanks to Dewsnup, the question is in far more doubt if the creditor relies on§ 506(d), 
which is fully applicable in all types of bankruptcy proceedings as a basis for strip down or strip off, rather 
than one of the chapter-specific modification provisions. See infra Part II.C.2. 
70 The "question ... all of this begs," Judge Martin lamented, is exactly what are these "rights" that may 
not be modified by the debtors' plan? In re Kirchner, 216 B.R. 417,421 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1997). 
71 !d. at 419 n.2. Significantly, the value had been stipulated by the parties, so there was no issue of 
potential inaccuracy in the judicial valuation as might occur when the value is disputed. See infra notes 209, 
282 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra note 19. We observed specifically that the strategy would only be assured of working with 
respect to nonresidential real property. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2299-300 & n.251. 
Moreover, unlike in Kirchner, our hypothetical did not contemplate a proposed sale of the debtors' home. 
73 Kirchner, 216 B.R. at 421-22. 
74 !d. at 422-23 (noting that under Wisconsin law, an in rem foreclosure judgment may exceed the value 
of the foreclosed property if the amount due on the underlying note exceeds that market value of the property). 
75 !d. at 425. 
76 !d. at 423-24 & n.l8. The point made by Judge Martin was that, even if able to credit bid a foreclosure 
judgment equal to the value of the underlying debt, as a regulated financial institution, the lender in this case 
would be required to dispose promptly of the foreclosed property (generally considered a "toxic" asset-
expensive to maintain and considered nonearning assets for balance sheet purposes). !d. Thus, in the end, the 
lender would receive no more than the current value of the property that the debtors' proposed to pay from the 
sales proceeds, and perhaps less, given the tendency of forced sales to produce lower prices. !d. 
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reasoned that, to compel the mortgagee to accept that result would deprive it of 
the right assured by Nobelman to foreclose in the manner prescribed by state 
(in this case Wisconsin) law.77 Due to the mortgagee's state law right to "credit 
bid" the full amount of its judgment at a foreclosure sale, this would include 
the right to receive the full amount of the underlying debt if the debtors' sought 
to redeem the property.78 Judge Martin conceded, however, that there was no 
indication that debtors "presently have or ever will have the ability to redeem 
the property."79 Thus, the debtors' proposal to sell the residence and turnover 
the stipulated current value to the bank was truly the economic equivalent of 
the bank's protected right to foreclose, but nonetheless determined to be a 
prohibited modification. 80 
B. Strip Off in Chapter 7 
Left unanswered by both Dewsnup and Nobelman, which prohibited strip 
down of chapter 7 and residential mortgage loans in chapter 13, respectively, 81 
is the question of strip off of liens with no economic stake in the collateral (i.e., 
wholly underwater, or unsecured, liens). While some courts initially concluded 
that strip off of valueless liens in chapter 7 was not precluded by Dewsnup,82 
the overwhelming weight of authority in appellate decisions, including three 
77 !d. at 422. 
78 Supra note 76. 
79 Kirchner, 216 B.R. at 423. For this reason, Judge Martin quite accurately noted that "the right to 
foreclose property possessed by Union would appear to give it an economic right that is realistically equal only 
to the intrinsic value of the property." !d. 
80 The court speculated on possible non-economic motives for objecting to the plan, such as the desire to 
avoid any precedent establishing the ability of strip down in a chapter 20 case or even personal animus toward 
the debtors, but concluded such motive was unclear. !d. at 424. 
81 See supra Part I. 
82 See, e.g., Warthen v. Smith (In re Smith), 247 B.R. 191, 197 (W.D. Va. 2000); Yi v. Citibank (Md.), 
N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 399 (E.D. Va. 1998); Farha v. First Am. Title Ins. (In re Farha), 246 B.R. 547, 
550 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); Zempel v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Zempel), 244 B.R. 625, 629-30 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1999). The analysis of the district court in Yi is representative of the approach taken by the courts in 
these cases. Specifically, the court in that case first distinguished Dewsnup based on the fact that two prior 
deeds of trust had "eaten up" any value in the property for the lien as to which avoidance was sought. Yi, 219 
B.R. at 397. As for the argument regarding potential future appreciation, the court observed that the "argument 
proves too much, for if accepted it would mean that no claim could ever be deemed unsecured under the 
second part of § 506(a), given that there is always some theoretical potential for the value of the collateral to 
increase." !d. at 398. Lastly, the court noted that its decision was consistent with Nobelman, even though the 
Supreme Court established in that case that a creditor might be regarded as "secured" for some purpose beyond 
the value of its collateral. !d. Specifically, the Yi court relied on Nobelman' s instruction that, in order for this to 
be the case, it is necessary in the first place to consult § 506(a) to determine that the creditor is the holder of a 
secured claim to at least some event. !d. at 399; see also supra note 56. 
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published circuit court opinions, draw no distinction between partially and 
totally unsecured liens in terms of the reach of the holding in Dewsnup.83 The 
diverging analyses of the bankruptcy and district courts in Wachovia Mortgage 
v. Smoot, are illustrative. 84 
In Smoot, the chapter 7 debtor filed an adversary proceeding in the 
bankruptcy court to avoid a wholly unsecured second mortgage on her primary 
residence.85 Applying§ 506(a) to determine the status of the creditor's secured 
claim, and relying on the Second Circuit's decision in In re Pond-a decision 
holding that a wholly unsecured mortgage lien is not protected from 
modification under § 1322(b)(2)86-the bankruptcy court concluded that there 
was no basis for treating unsecured mortgage liens differently in chapter 7 than 
in chapter 13.87 Thus, the court found the valueless lien "null and void" 
pursuant to§ 506(d).88 
83 See, e.g., Palomar v. First American Bank, 722 F.3d 992, 994-95 (7th Cir. 2013); Talbert v. City Mort. 
Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) superseding Farha v. First Am. Title Ins. (In re 
Farha), 246 B.R. 547 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000), and Zempel v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Zempel), 244 B.R. 
625 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999); Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001) 
superseding Smith, 247 B.R. at 197, and Yi, 219 B.R. at 397; see also Laskin v. First Nat'! Bank of Keystone 
(In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the rationales articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Dewsnup apply with equal force whether the lien is wholly unsecured or merely 
undersecured). The Laskin court also based its holding on the fact that, "[s]ection 506 was intended to facilitate 
valuation and disposition of property in the reorganization chapters of the Code, not to confer an additional 
avoiding power on a [c]hapter 7 debtor." Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876 (citing Oregon v. Lange (In re Lange), 120 
B.R. 132, 135 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)). The appropriateness of this statement is discussed infra notes 274-77, 
given that the provisions of chapter 5 of the Code apply in all types of debtor relief cases, including chapter 7. 
84 Smoot v. Wachovia Mort. (In re Smoot), 465 B.R. 730 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd sub nom. 
Wachovia Mort. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
85 !d. at 731. 
86 Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2001) (ruling that 
antimodification is triggered only when there is sufficient equity in the collateral to cover some portion of the 
creditor's claim); see also infra text accompanying notes 109-10. In addition, Judge Eisenberg, who decided 
Smoot, had issued two earlier opinions permitting strip off in chapter 7. In re Lavelle, No. 09-72389-478,2009 
WL 4043089 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); Howard v. Nat'! Westminster Bank (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
87 Smoot, 465 B.R. at 730, 734-35 (stating that there is no statutory prohibition in the application of 
§ 506(a) and (d) to chapter 7 cases). 
88 !d. at 736; cf Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36,40 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (making the 
point, albeit in the context of a chapter 13 proceeding, that, "if a lien has no 'security' interest in property of 
the debtor, its status as a lien is questionable"). 
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On appeal, the district court reversed. 89 After extensive review of the prior 
case law and applicable statutory edicts, the court reasoned that the Second 
Circuit's (and other court's) allowance of strip off of unsecured home 
mortgages hinged upon a "unique statutory predicate" in chapter 13 that has no 
analog in chapter 7; specifically, § 1322(b)(2).90 Thus, Pond could not, the 
court reasoned, represent controlling precedent in chapter 7. 91 Likewise, the 
court found the statement in Nobelman that, in applying § 1322(b )(2), a court 
must first look to § 506(a) to determine if a claim is "secured only by a 
security interest in real property that is the debtor's residence,"92 is inapposite 
in chapter 7.93 Instead, the court found that Dewsnup's interpretation of the 
relationship between § 506(a) and (d), and particularly its finding as to the 
irrelevance of valuation under the former in determining the scope of 
avoidance under the latter, constrained chapter 7 debtors from avoiding 
valueless unsecured liens with equal force and logic as in the case of 
undersecured liens.94 By way of explanation, the court cited the Sixth Circuit's 
articulation of the three key analytical underpinnings of Dewsnup: (1) that 
post-filing appreciation belongs to the creditor; (2) that the parties bargain ex 
ante for the lien to remain with the property; and (3) that liens pass through 
bankruptcy unaffected, none of which depend on the lien having at least some 
value.95 
At the same time, the district court in Smoot did throw a bouquet to the 
bankruptcy court, noting that the lower court's decision reflected "the more 
logical position, and the one supported by a large volume of legal 
commentary."96 In addition, the court cited with approval Judge Wizmur's 
statement in In re Cook,97 that reading § 506(a) and (d) together so as to allow 
89 Wachovia Mort. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The decision actually involved two separate 
appeals that were consolidated since they involved the exact same issue-i.e., the permissibility of strip off in 
chapter 7. 
90 !d. at 564, 567. 
91 !d. at 564. 
92 Supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
93 Smoot, 478 B.R. at 568-69 (stating, as to the Supreme Court's interpretation of"secured" in Dewsnup, 
"although it is arguably an unusual reading of the statute, it plainly appears that the Supreme Court intended 
the concept of 'secured' to have a specific definition in the chapter 7 context, so that valuation of the 
underlying collateral is irrelevant"). 
94 !d. at 564. 
95 !d. at 565 (citing Talbert v. City Mort. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555,559 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
96 !d. at 569-70. 
97 In reCook, 432 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010). 
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a junior lien with no value to be stripped off in chapter 7 is premised on sound 
principles of statutory construction that would be controlling were the court 
writing on a clean slate.98 Yet, like Judge Wizmur, the district court in Smoot 
concluded that Dewsnup represented the "law of the land" and must be 
obeyed.99 
The one outlier thus far among the circuit courts is the Eleventh Circuit, 
which, in an initially unpublished opinion in In re McNeal, permitted strip off 
of a wholly unsecured junior lien. 100 The panel's decision, issued per curiam, is 
brief, noting simply that Dewsnup involved strip down, and not strip off. 
Therefore, the court concluded that it did not abrogate prior pre-Dewsnup 
circuit precedent permitting strip off of a subordinate lien unsupported by any 
value. 101 The lienholder adversely affected by the decision in McNeal, GMAC 
Mortgage L.L.C. ("GMAC"), filed a petition for rehearing en bane, but before 
the court could rule on that request, GMAC filed its own petition for relief 
under chapter 11, resulting in a considerable delay as the courts sought to 
ascertain the effect of the stay in GMAC' s case on the appellate proceeding in 
McNeal. 102 As this article goes to print, it appears the issue of rehearing vel 
non of the decision in McNeal in the Eleventh Circuit will be addressed by that 
court, 103 but the outcome of course is uncertain. In the meantime, because 
Eleventh Circuit Rules provide that, while not binding precedent, unpublished 
opinions can serve as persuasive authority, the lower courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit have, since the original decision was rendered, generally (although to a 
degree reluctantly) deferred to the panel's decision in McNeal pending 
f . 1' 104 ma 1ty. 
98 !d. at 527. 
99 Smoot, 478 B.R. at 570 (citing Cunningham v. Homecomings Fin. Network (In re Cunningham), 246 
B.R. 241,246 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)). 
100 McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., L.L.C. (In re McNeal), 735 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2012) (originally 477 F. 
App'x562). 
101 !d. at 564 (citing Folendore v. Small Business Administration (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537 (11th 
Cir. 1989)) (noting that Dewsnup was not "clearly" on point, and, thus, did not overrule the court's decision in 
Folendore). 
102 The various machinations following the panel decision in McNeal are ably and carefully catalogued in 
In re Alonso, 495 B.R. 53 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). The situation was further complicated by the fact that the 
loan at issue in McNeal was no longer being serviced by GMAC, resulting in an additional motion for 
substitution of parties in McNeal, so that the petition for rehearing could go forward notwithstanding the stay 
in GMAC's case. !d. at 54. 
103 !d. at 55. 
104 See, e.g., Rogers-Dude v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 498 B.R. 348, 352-53 (S.D. Fla. 2013); 
Campbell v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank (In re Campbell), 498 B.R. 370, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (reluctantly 
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C. Strip Off in Chapters 13 and 20 
1. Under§ 1322(b)(2) 
As discussed by the district court in Smoot, 105 the district and circuit courts 
have almost uniformly affirmed the ability to strip off unsecured liens in 
chapter 13, even as against the debtor's primary residence. 106 In First Mariner 
Bank v. Johnson, for example, the bankruptcy court was faced with the 
scenario where the first lien against the debtors' residence, with a fair market 
value of $555,000, secured a debt with a balance of $662,000.107 While 
acknowledging the preclusion under§ 1322(b)(2) from modifying that lien, the 
debtors nonetheless sought to strip off a second lien, securing a debt of 
$82,000.108 Referring specifically to precedent from other circuits, 109 the court 
held that the antimodification limitation in § 1322(b )(2) does not come into 
play unless and until the creditor can demonstrate that it has an allowed 
secured claim within the meaning of§ 506(a).110 By definition, the holder of a 
lien unsupported by any economic value cannot meet that burden. Its state law 
rights are, as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel put it, "empty 
following McNeal); Malone v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Malone). 489 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013) (wherein 
Judge Diehl. while expressing her skepticism that Folendore could be reconciled with Dewsnup. followed 
McNeal in allowing the chapter 7 debtor to strip off a junior lien unsupported by any equity in the underlying 
collateral). 
105 Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot (In re Smoot). 478 B.R. 555, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). See supra text 
accompanying note 90. 
106 The one somewhat unusual exception is discussed in detail infra Part II.C.2. 
107 First Mariner Bank v. Johnson, 411 B.R. 221. 222 (D. Md. 2009). aff'd mem. per curiam sub nom. 
First Mariner Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 407 F. App'x 713 (4th Cir. 2011). 
108 !d. 
109 The court referred to authority from the 6th and lith Circuits. First Mariner, 411 B.R. at 224 (citing 
Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002) and Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., 
Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (lith Cir. 2000)). However, no less than four other circuits have also 
held that§ 1322(b)(2) may be invoked to strip off a wholly unsecured lien in chapter 13, even though that lien 
encumbers that debtor's principal residence. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012); Zimmer v. PSB Lending 
Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 
F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 
2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2000); see also 
Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Schmidt (In re Schmidt), No. 0:13-cv-00434, 2013 WL 2470218 (D. Minn. June 
07, 2013). 
11° First Mariner, 411 B.R. at 223-24. The origins of this analysis trace their roots back, of course, to the 
Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Nobelman that the first step in determining if a claim is subject to 
modification under § 1322(b )(2) is to ascertain if that claim is secured within the meaning of § 506(a). See 
supra text accompanying notes 56, 82. 
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rights from a practical, if not a legal standpoint."m The court in First Mariner 
also rejected the mortgagee's policy-based argument concerning the 
importance of encouraging the flow of capital into the residential real estate 
market, noting this aim pertains only in the case of first or purchase-money 
mortgages. 112 
Although the bankruptcy filing in First Mariner postdated the effective 
date of BAPCPA, no mention was made of the changes to §§ 1325(a) and 1328 
wrought by the 2005 amendments, most likely because First Mariner was not 
preceded by an earlier chapter 7 case. These provisions, however, figured 
prominently in Branigan v. Davis113 and the discussion that follows. 114 Thus, 
they merit a quick review. As part and parcel of the implementation of 
BAPCP A's paramount twin objectives of correcting perceived abuses of the 
bankruptcy system and ensuring that debtors who have the ability to pay more 
to their creditors do so, 115 BAPCPA made a number of changes to chapter 13, 
including several intended to bolster the stability of secured claims. 116 Among 
them were amendments to § 1325(a)(5), providing for retention of the lien 
securing an allowed secured claim ( 1) until the earlier of payment or discharge 
of the underlying debt, and (2) upon conversion or dismissal of the case 
without completion of the plan.117 In addition, a new subsection (f) was added 
111 Lam v. Investors Thrift (In re Lam), 211 B.R. 36, 40 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). 
112 First Mariner, 411 B.R. at 224-25 (citing McDonald, 205 F.3d at 613, and Bartee, 212 F.3d at 293). 
The policy of encouraging the flow of capital into the home lending market as the justification of favored 
treatment for residential mortgages was also the basis for Justice Stevens's concurrence in Nobelman. See 
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
113 Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2013). 
114 See infra text accompanying notes 119-44. 
115 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 88-89. For an extensive 
description of the legislative history, see also Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005). The extent to which the 
perception of consumer irresponsibility and abuse was accurate, and even if so, the effectiveness of BAPCPA 
in responding to it, is open to serious question. See generally David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed 
Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 223, 227 (2007) (concluding the means test in 
§ 707(b), perhaps the centerpiece of BAPCPA's abuse prevention measures, has, at best, produced no effect, 
and may actually have encouraged greater bankruptcy abuse); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The 
Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 
84 TEX. L. REv. 1481, 1488 (2006) (arguing that the credit industries-not opportunistic debtors who abuse 
the bankruptcy system-are responsible for the increase in bankruptcy filings). 
116 See generally Eugene Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U.lLL. L. REv. 
31,60-65. 
117 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) (2012). Subject to the hardship discharge provisions in § 1328(b), a 
discharge in chapter 13 is entered after completion of final payment under the plan. See id. § 1328(a)-(b ). 
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to § 1328 prohibiting a debtor from receiving a discharge in chapter 13 if the 
debtor received a discharge in a chapter 7 case filed within four years 
preceding the filing of the chapter 13 case.118 
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Branigan involved two separate chapter 20 
cases arising from the same district and that had been consolidated by the 
district court for purposes of the first -level appeal. 119 In both cases, the 
bankruptcy court had approved, and the district court affirmed, a plan calling 
for the strip off of a valueless junior lien on the debtors' respective 
residences.120 The issue of good faith was not challenged in one of the cases, 
and was specifically found to exist in the other. 121 The chapter 13 trustee, who 
was the same in both cases, as well as the holder of the avoided junior lien in 
one of the cases, brought the appeal. 122 Initially, consistent with First Mariner, 
the majority observed the overwhelming weight of authority permitting the 
stripping off of wholly underwater liens against principal residences in chapter 
13, Nobelman notwithstanding.123 The court then turned to the main issue on 
appeal and one as to which the cases are split; that is, whether BAPCPA 
operated to preclude strip off of valueless liens in chapter 20 cases.124 
The trustee contended that lien stripping is dependent upon the debtor's 
ability to receive a chapter 13 discharge, which neither of the debtors in this 
case would be entitled to because of the restriction in§ 1328(f)(l).125 The basis 
for this contention was the language added to § 1325(a)(5)(B) concerning a 
118 !d. § 1328(1)(1). This restriction on the chapter 13 discharge implicitly puts, for the first time, a 
temporal boundary on what will be considered a chapter 20 case. Moreover, a debtor cannot avoid this bar on 
the chapter 13 discharge by seeking revocation of the earlier discharge in chapter 7. See In re Ross, No. 1:12-
bk-19182, 2013 WL 3070906, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013). 
119 The district court had consolidated the cases below, and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decisions 
without opinion. Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331,334 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013). 
120 In one of the two cases, that of Bryan and Carla Davis, the debtors' plan proposed to strip off two 
underwater junior liens against certain rental property, as well as a third priority lien against their home. !d. at 
333-34. According to the facts, the second lien against their home was also entirely unsecured based on the 
value assigned to the property and the amount of the first lien, but there is no explanation of why strip off was 
not sought or granted with respect to that lien. !d. 
121 !d. at 334. 
122 The holder of the third lien against the Davises' home was also an appellant. !d. at 332, 334. 
123 !d. at 334-36. See also supra note 109. 
124 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 336 (comparing the opinions of multiple bankruptcy courts). Notably, however, 
Branigan is the first court of appeals to address the question. See also In re Jennings, 454 B.R. 252, 256-57 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (reviewing what the court describes as three separate approaches to lien stripping in 
chapter 20 cases). 
125 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 337. 
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lienholder's retention of its lien pending either payment or discharge. 126 The 
trustee also urged that permitting strip off under these circumstances would 
inappropriately amount, as Professor Knippenberg and I pointed out in 1997,127 
to an "end run around" the Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup, and further 
would be inconsistent with "BAPCP A's goal of rebalancing the scales in favor 
of creditors."128 
While crediting the weight of the trustee's arguments, the court was 
ultimately not persuaded. 129 Initially, the majority opinion pointed to its earlier 
holding that, even when applicable, § 1328(f)(l) does not bar a debtor from 
filing under chapter 13, and that there may be good and sufficient reasons for 
doing so apart from the discharge. 130 Thus, the question became whether the 
Code provides a mechanism for stripping off worthless liens absent a 
discharge. 131 The majority answered the question in the affirmative, noting that 
modification of secured claims has always been permitted under the 
combination of§§ 506 and 1322(b).132 The opinion continued that, "BAPCPA 
did not amend[§§] 506 or 1322(b), so the analysis permitting lien stripping in 
[c]hapter 20 cases is no different than in any other [c]hapter 13 case."133 As for 
the new language in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) regarding retention of the lien, the court 
observed that this provision applies only to an "allowed secured claim" within 
126 !d. 
127 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Although, we did not regard this technique as 
"inappropriate." 
128 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 337; cf Lindskog v. M & I Bank (In re Lindskog), 451 B.R. 863, 866 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wise. 2011) (reasoning that lien stripping in a chapter 20 case amounts to an impermissible "end run" 
around§ 1328(f)(l)). 
129 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 337-38. 
130 !d. at 336 (citing Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272,283 (4th Cir. 2008)) (noting the 
protections or benefits available under chapter 13, other than discharge, that might be incentives for a debtor to 
file for relief even when§ 1328(f) applies). 
131 !d. at 338. 
132 !d. Recall that what distinguishes Nobelman from Dewsnup is recognizing the need to first consult 
§ 506(a) to determine if the creditor's claim is secured at all. See supra notes 56, 82 and accompanying text. 
133 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 338. The ability to strip off an unsecured lien under chapter 13, when 
uncomplicated by an earlier chapter 7 filing, is accepted almost without exception. See supra note 109 and 
accompanying text; cf infra Part II.C.2 (examining the one notable, but distinguishable, exception). 
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit limited its holding by ruling that in the case of property held in a tenancy by 
the entirety, strip off of a valueless lien would not be permitted when only one tenant spouse filed for 
bankruptcy. Alvarez v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (In re Alvarez), No. 12-1156, 2013 WL 5737704 (4th Cir. 
Oct. 23, 2013). 
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the meaning of § 506(a).134 Under the latter provision, of course, the 
mortgagees in these cases held wholly unsecured claims, so § 1325(a)(5) did 
not apply to them. 135 The in rem component of those claims could thus be 
stripped off despite the unavailability of a discharge in chapter 20, since the 
discharge, the majority noted, alters only in personam rights and not in rem 
liability. 136 Lastly, as far as end-running around Dewsnup was concerned, the 
majority declared that the Code was best viewed as leaving chapter 13's lien-
stripping regime intact, and, as the Supreme Court first observed in Johnson, 137 
pointed to the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3) to sift out uses of the 
chapter 20 device undertaken with improper ulterior motive. 138 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Keenan expressed the view that the 
provisions of BAPCP A affecting secured claims in bankruptcy should be read 
to prohibit the elimination of valueless liens in chapter 20 cases where no 
discharge would be granted.139 Specifically, Judge Keenan focused on 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(l), requiring the plan to provide that the holder of an 
allowed secured claim retain its lien until the earlier of full payment or 
134 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 338. A few courts have adopted an intermediate approach between permitting 
and not permitting lien stripping in chapter 20, which makes little sense other than as a good faith attempt to 
apply the awkward and often ill-fitting provision of BAPCPA. These courts permit a debtor to confirm a plan 
that strips off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage, but then reinstates the lien under § 349(b)(l)(C) on the 
reasoning that the only way the case can be closed after completion of the plan is by dismissal, since there can 
be no discharge. See, e.g., Grandstaff v. Casey (In re Casey), 428 B.R. 519, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010); see 
also 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(l)(C) (2012). 
135 This is essentially the same exercise courts have used to distinguish the holding in Nobelman in 
chapter 13 cases involving wholly underwater liens; that is, both§§ 1322(b)(2) and 1325(a)(5) only apply to 
the "holder of a secured claim," which is to say a claim that is "secured," within the meaning of § 506(a), at 
least to some extent. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331 
(1993). 
136 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 339 ("We simply hold today that the bankruptcy court may strip the in rem 
component of a valueless lien."); accord In re Dolinak, No. 1;12-bk-13500, 2013 W1. 3294277, at *5 (D.N.H. 
June 28, 2013); cf Colbourne v. Ocwen (In re Colbourne), No. 12-14722, 2013 W1. 5789159 (11th Cir. Oct. 
29, 2013) (affirming the denial of cram down of partially secured liens in a Chapter 20 case because of the 
combination of§§ 1325(a)(5) and 1328(1)(1)). 
137 Supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
138 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 338-39 (observing that while BAPCPA may have tipped the scales back in 
favor of creditors, there is nothing in the Act that bars the strip off of worthless liens). The court also indicated 
that creditors are protected by § 349(b)(l)(C), presumably if the plan is not consummated and the case 
dismissed, but, as discussed infra note 153, this is not altogether clear. !d.; see§ 349(b)(l)(C) (2012). For an 
example of a decision subsequent to Branigan where strip off was denied, and the case dismissed, based on 
lack of good faith, see In re Mulhern, No. 12-20857PM, 2013 W1. 3992458 (Bankr. D. Md. Aug. 2, 2013) 
(finding that the sole purpose for the second filing was to enable the debtors to avoid a junior lien on their 
home). 
139 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 339 (Keenan, J., dissenting). 
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discharge, neither of which, of course, will occur in a chapter 20 case, as it has 
now come to be defined. 140 As for the analysis in the majority opinion that the 
claims at issue were not "allowed secured claims," the dissent observed that a 
claim remains secured regardless of how it is valued under § 506(a). 141 Relying 
on the language from Nobelman concerning the relationship between §§ 506(a) 
and 1322(b )(2), 142 Judge Keenan maintained that a secured creditor's protected 
rights under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) should not be affected by the valuation process 
in § 506(a). 143 The dissent, however, arguably missed the primary teaching of 
Nobelman that even if a secured creditor's protected rights exceed the value of 
the collateral, there must in the first instance be at least some value (over and 
above the sum of prior liens) in order for the claim to be regarded as 
secured. 144 Thus, the majority seems to have the better of it in Branigan. 
The court's decision in Branigan is significant in an additional respect 
relating to the timing of strip off. Recall that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(l) provides that 
the holder of an allowed secured claim retains its lien until the earlier of 
payment of the debt as determined under nonbankruptcy law or entry of 
discharge, and § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(II) provides for retention of the lien securing 
the claim in the event of conversion or dismissal. 145 In In re Fisette, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit held, consistent with First 
Mariner and other circuit decisions, that a debtor could modify the rights of a 
creditor with a wholly unsecured lien against the debtor's principal 
residence.146 Unlike First Mariner, however, but similar to Branigan, the 
140 I d. at 340-41. 
141 Judge Keenan reasoned that the term "allowed secured claim" for purposes of § 1325(a)(5) is not 
defined by § 506(a), but rather describes a claim that is "allowed" under § 502 and "secured" in a state law 
sense. !d. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)(aa)-(bb)). In effect, this is a Dewsnup-iike analysis of 
"allowed secured claim," which has been discredited in every context outside of the narrow factual 
circumstances of Dewsnup. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
142 Specifically, the dissent emphasized the point in Nobelman that valuation under § 506(a) did not 
automatically adjust downward the amount of a mortgage for treatment in a chapter 13 plan. Branigan, 716 
F.3d at 340-41 (Keenan, J., dissenting) (citing Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,328-29 (1993)). 
143 !d. at 341 ("I would conclude that, like the creditor in Nobelman, the rights of the creditors in the 
present case are not altered by the valuation process of § 506(a) for allowed secured claims, because 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) otherwise protects the rights of such holders .... "); see II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i). This 
type of analysis is consistent with the creditor's bargain model, emphasizing deference to a secured creditor's 
state law rights, discussed briefly infra text accompanying notes 202-06. 
144 See supra notes 56, 109 and accompanying text. 
145 II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)-(II). 
146 Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 182 & n.3 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). See supra notes 107-
12 and accompanying text. 
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debtor was not eligible for a discharge in the chapter 13 case because of 
§ 1328(f)(l).147 The Fisette court decided that entitlement to a discharge was 
not a prerequisite for lien avoidance, but, because of the possibility that the 
plan could not be consummated leading to conversion or dismissal, the court 
specifically deferred the actual strip off of the lien until "completion of the 
debtor's obligations under his plan .... "148 Based on an analysis similar to the 
majority opinion in Branigan, the court's reasoning that § 1325(a)(5) does not 
apply in the case of wholly unsecured liens, 149 the justification for seemingly 
conditioning strip off on successful completion of the plan, as required by 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(l), is altogether unclear. 
By contrast to Fissette, in Branigan it appears from the majority opinion's 
recitation of the facts that strip off of the underwater liens in each of the cases 
giving rise to the appeal occurred at the time of confirmation. 150 This 
assumption is buttressed by the majority's later reference to § 349(b)(l)(C) as 
protecting creditors in circumstances where the debtor attempts to improperly 
use chapter 20 solely to strip off such creditor's lien. 151 Under that provision, 
the majority noted, the lien "springs back" to life. 152 Obviously, a lien can 
neither spring back nor be "restored" unless it has first been eliminated. 153 
147 Fisette, 455 B.R. at 184. 
148 !d. at 185 (strip off of unsecured lien on debtor's residence is effective upon completion of the debtor's 
obligation under his plan). Two other bankruptcy courts have held that, in a chapter 20 situation, lien 
avoidance becomes "permanent" when the debtor completes all payments under the plan. See In re Dolinak, 
No. 1:12-bk-13500, 2013 WL 3294277, at *8 (D.N.H. June 28, 2013); In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90, 100 (Bankr. 
D. Nev. 2011); see also Bank of the Prairie v. Picht (In re Picht), 428 B.R. 885, 890 (B.A.P. lOth Cir. 2010) 
(overruling bankruptcy court's confirmation of plan calling for release of lien against their residence upon 
payment under the plan of an amount equal to the equity in the property in excess of the first mortgage). 
149 See supra text accompanying note 135. 
150 Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2013). One such statement is, "Finding 
that the Davises had acted in good faith, Judge Lipp entered an order stripping off the third-priority lien on the 
Davises' home." !d. Other cases appear to allow strip off of valueless junior liens at plan confirmation. See In 
re Tran, 431 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010); Grandstaff v. Casey (In re Casey), 428 B.R. 519 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 2010); see also In re Wapshare, 492 B.R. 211, 217-18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that while the 
junior mortgagee's claim, which was wholly unsupported by any equity, could be stripped off and would be 
reclassified as unsecured, the lien was nonetheless subject to being reinstated if the plan failed and the case 
was dismissed). 
151 Branigan, 716 F.3d at 338. 
152 !d. 
153 On the other hand, by its terms§ 349(b)(l)(C) applies only to liens avoided under§ 506(d), rather than 
under § 1322(b )(2), so its applicability is unclear, as is what would happen if the lien is stripped at the time of 
confirmation and the debtors fail to complete the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(l)(C) (2012); supra note 138; 
see also Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Schmidt (In re Schmidt), No. 0;13-cv-00434, 2013 WL 2470218, at *8 
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Whether or not the lien (the in rem claim) continues as an encumbrance 
against the property until completion of the plan may not make much 
difference in some situations, but would seem to make a considerable 
difference in circumstances where the debtor, during the life of the plan, 
desires to sell the property, for whatever reason, or needs to sell the property in 
order to fund the plan. While the debtor's personal liability would have been 
discharged in the earlier chapter 7 case, the continued existence of the 
otherwise worthless lien obviously impairs the debtor's ability to supply 
merchantable title to a buyer, thus potentially conferring enormous unearned 
strategic leverage on the holder of the otherwise worthless lien. 154 
2. Under§ 506( d) 
In an extraordinary case and opinion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower 
courts' denial of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan that proposed strip off of a 
wholly underwater lien against the debtor's personal residence. 155 What is 
remarkable about the case, which stands in opposition to the overwhelming 
weight of authority permitting a debtor to employ § 1322(b )(2) to strip off an 
unsecured lien even as against a personal residence, 156 is that the debtors 
deliberately based their argument on § 506(d), rather than § 1322(b)(2), and 
unequivocally maintained that position even when offered the opportunity by 
the court to file supplemental briefing on the applicability and effect of 
§ 1322(b )(2) in the case. 157 It also bears specific mention that the debtors in 
this case had not filed an earlier chapter 7 in order to discharge personal 
(D. Minn. June 7, 2013) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision calling for avoidance of a creditor's wholly 
unsecured mortgage against debtors' residence upon debtors' completion of the plan). 
154 Consider a scenario where the debtor owns a home worth $100,000 at the time of confirmation, subject 
to a first lien mortgage of $110,000 and a second lien of $25,000. If by sometime in year three of the plan the 
property has appreciated to $120,000 and the debtor proposes to sell it to reach the equity, the holder of the 
second (to be avoided) lien, while presumably not entitled to that equity, can hold up the sale by refusing to 
release its lien, or, worse, can insist on receiving a portion of the sales proceeds as a condition to releasing the 
worthless lien. 
155 Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266 (lOth Cir. 2012). 
156 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
157 Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1279 (relating that in response to the court's request for additional briefing on the 
application of § 1322(b)(2), "the Woolseys made plain they wanted no part of the argument."). As the 
appellants were represented on appeal by not only a Salt Lake City consumer debtors' bankruptcy lawyer, but 
also lawyers from Ballard Spahr, LLP, a firm that does not make a routine practice of representing debtors in 
chapter 13, one can only assume that the desire to "make law" was as much a motive in the appeal as the desire 
to remove the wholly underwater lien from the debtors' residence. 
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liability on the claim; instead, this was a simple chapter 13, uncomplicated by 
the issues which have split the courts in the chapter 20 scenario. 158 
The court began its analysis with a review of Dewsnup's odd interpretation 
of§ 506(d) as pertaining only when the lien is not allowed and not secured.159 
Although noting that the rationales offered by the Court in Dewsnup in support 
of its holding were dubious at best, 160 and indeed may have "warped the 
bankruptcy code's seemingly straight path into a crooked one," the court noted 
that it is the law and must be followed. 161 As for the debtors' attempt to 
distinguish Dewsnup by limiting it to chapter 7 cases only, which the court 
clearly found compelling from a policy-based perspective, 162 the court was 
unable to bring itself to conclude that § 506(d) means different things in 
different kinds of bankruptcy cases. 163 In yet another stroke of irony, the 
determining factor for the court in declining the attractive invitation to "undo" 
(or at least further limit) Dewsnup in the fashion urged by the debtors was the 
Supreme Court's more recent admonitions that giving the same words in a 
statute different meaning in different categories of cases is "methodologically 
incoherent and categorically prohibited .... "164 
Ill. RETURN FROM THE WILDERNESS (THE SECTION WITH NO NAME) 
As has been seen, after reviewing and attempting to harmonize the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson, Dewsnup, and Nobelman, Judge 
158 !d. at 1273-75. See supra note 124. 
159 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
160 Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1274 (observing that pre-Code practice is of limited interpretative value in this 
context and that, ordinarily, the "windfall" resulting from subsequent appreciation in the property following 
strip down will be enjoyed by the remaining unsecured creditors, not the debtor). 
161 !d. at 1276 (observing, "[r]ight or wrong, the Dewsnuppian departure from the statute's plain language 
is the law," but also commenting that "[Dewsnup's] definition of 'secured claim' has been rejected time after 
time elsewhere in the [C]ode ... "). 
162 !d. at 1274-75. The debtors noted that, of course,§ 506(d) applies in all debtor relief chapters, but that 
very different considerations are at work in chapter 13 (and, for that matter, chapter 11) than in a straight 
liquidation. They also pointed out the potentially perverse impact on chapter choice that applying Dewsnup in 
the reorganization context would promote; i.e., compelling debtors facing the burden of full repayment under 
chapter 13 to throw in the towel and simply liquidate under chapter 7. Further, the debtors emphasized the 
Court's own language in Dewsnup concerning the limited precedential value of the holding. !d. at 1276; see 
supra note 68; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012). 
163 Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1277. 
164 !d. (citing United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522-23 (2008); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,378 
(2005)). 
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Martin, in In re Kirchner, 165 decided that the attempted modification of the 
mortgagee's rights, even though not calculated to impair the lender's economic 
interests in any manner, was impermissible. 166 He lamented, however, that he 
hazarded this prediction with "little confidence" and considerable trepidation 
that the Supreme Court's next disquisition on the subject could well head in yet 
another direction. 167 While the Court has yet to seize that opportunity in the 
ensuing 16-plus years, the treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy generally, 
and chapter 13 or 20 in particular, has been further muddied by the provisions 
of BAPCPA, 168 as aptly demonstrated by the split opinion in Branigan.169 But 
therein may also lay, doubtless without advertence, 170 a trail out of the thicket. 
The path begins, unexpectedly enough, with yet another BAPCPA 
amendment to § 1325(a). It is an addition to the statute that appears as a new 
subparagraph following § 1325(a)(9), but it does not bear a separate letter or 
number. 171 Hence it has come to be termed the "hanging paragraph" or 
§ 1325(a)(*).172 Whatever the sobriquet, in substance the new provision 
provides that for purposes of § 1325(a)(5)---conceming the permissible 
treatment of secured claims in a chapter 13 plan-"[§] 506(a) shall not apply" 
to a claim described in § 1325(a)(5) if the creditor has: (1) "a purchase money 
security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was 
incurred within the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the 
petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle" 
(sometimes referred to as "910 day vehicles" and "910 day vehicle loans"); or 
(2) "if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt 
was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing." 173 
Doubtless, this provision was intended principally to benefit the financing 
subsidiaries of the major auto manufactures and other financial institutions 
165 In re Kirchner, 216 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1997) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 70-
80). 
166 !d. at 425. 
167 !d. 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
169 Supra text accompanying notes 130-44. 
17° Congress' principal goal in BAPCPA was to increase payouts to creditors, surely not to offer guidance 
on the proper understanding of secured debt in bankruptcy. See Jensen, supra note 115. 
171 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012). 
172 Hereinafter, I will refer to the hanging paragraph as"§ 1325(a)(*)." 
173 !d. § 1325(a). Unquestionably, this provision was intended to curb perceived abuse by "spendthrift 
debtors" by eliminating their ability to reduce their secured obligations on 910 vehicles. See Wells Fargo Fin. 
Acceptance v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez), 375 B.R. 535, 548 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
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regularly engaged in secured auto lending by precluding strip down of 
purchase money 910 vehicle loans.174 What is telling, however, is that in order 
to achieve that aim Congress found it either necessary or expedient to 
decommission the operation of § 506. The effect of doing so is that a claim, as 
defined in § 1325(a)(*), is not bifurcated under § 506(a) and therefore must be 
treated as fully secured for purposes of § 1322(b )(2). Implicitly, it is also a 
congressional acknowledgement that an "allowed secured claim," as used 
throughout the Code, derives fundamentally from the meaning assigned in 
§ 506(a)-Dewsnup notwithstanding. 175 While other Code provisions may, in a 
specific context, determine what may or may not be done to such claims, these 
claims owe their existence in the first instance to § 506(a). This interpretation 
stands in substantiation of the majority opinion's analysis in Branigan, 176 as 
well as the opinions of several other courts, that a creditor, though its debt be 
secured by a lien on the debtor's property, is not the holder of an "allowed 
secured claim" for bankruptcy purposes unless it is deemed to be so under 
§ 506(a); that is to say, the lien has some economic value as of the time of 
f 'l' 177 1 mg. 
From the perspective of core bankruptcy equality policy, this approach 
makes perfect sense. Under state law, a security interest has value, or at least 
the potential for value, beyond its current economic worth at a given moment. 
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, however, the curtain has come down on the 
debtor's prepetition life. 178 This needs to be so whether the aim of the case is a 
fresh start in chapter 7 or rehabilitation in chapter 11 or 13. Thus, the security 
interest's only value is axiomatically its current value. Allowing appropriation 
of additional or future value runs directly counter to the twin bankruptcy goals 
of equitable distribution and returning debtors to economic viability. 179 The 
174 See generally William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 
U. ILL L. REv. 143 (predicting that automobile lenders are likely to benefit more than any other group under 
BAPCPA). 
175 As noted by the Woolsey court, "Dewsnup has lost every game it has played: its definition ... seems to 
hold sway only in § 506(d)." Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1276 (lOth Cir. 
2012). 
176 Supra text accompanying notes 13(}-38. 
177 See infra text accompanying notes 254-58 regarding the difference from state law in the Code's 
approach to security. 
178 Hence, the broad definition of the term "claim" in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012): infra notes 
247-52 and accompanying text: see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
179 While it is open to some debate whether, because of§ 551, the avoidance of underwater lien inures to 
the benefit of the debtor or other unsecured creditors, see infra note 220, it is abundantly clear that allowing 
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state law analog is a foreclosure sale, after which all that is left is an unsecured 
deficiency claim for the balance of the debt over and above the net foreclosure 
sale proceeds. 180 That is precisely the way in which § 506(a) operates. 
What is the significance of taking § 506(a) out of the equation? One would 
presume the answer is a simple one, but it is not, as evidenced by the 
disagreement among courts over the impact of the hanging paragraph in 
circumstances where the debtor proposes to surrender rather than retain the 910 
vehicle. Once more, perhaps because of a better-attuned sensitivity to the 
substantive goals of the bankruptcy system, many bankruptcy courts initially 
took a quite different view on this issue than the consensus view that 
eventually developed among appellate courts. 181 The origin of the controversy 
lies in the fact that § 1325(a)(5) offers three alternatives for satisfying a 
secured claim in a chapter 13 plan: ( 1) approval by the secured creditor of 
whatever the plan proposes, (2) payment to the secured creditor over the life of 
the plan of an amount equal to at least the present value of the allowed amount 
of the secured claim, 182 or (3) surrender of the collateral to the secured creditor. 
If the collateral falls within the definition of the hanging paragraph and is 
worth less than the total amount owed to the secured creditor on the debt, and 
the plan provides for surrender of the collateral, the issue then becomes, has 
the hanging paragraph's disabling of bifurcation under § 506(a) effectively 
converted the debt to a nonrecourse (i.e., fully secured) claim by negating any 
unsecured component? 
expansion of the secured claim based on value accruing postpetition runs afoul of bankruptcy's aim to separate 
the debtor's pre- and postpetition lives. 
180 Even the majority in Dewsnup recognized this point in noting that a lien stays with the collateral until 
the foreclosure. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). In other words, the state law bargain is that, 
after foreclosure, the secured lender will recognize a deficiency, if at all, based on its in personam claim 
against the debtor. 
181 It will be recalled that, initially following Dewsnup, a number of bankruptcy (and a couple of district) 
courts concluded that the Court's holding did not apply to wholly underwater claims, but were overruled on 
appeal. See supra notes 66, 82 and accompanying text. The same phenomenon is observed frequently in 
bankruptcy, such as in connection with the test to be applied in determining whether a bad check prosecution is 
a "true" criminal proceeding exempt from the automatic stay or a disguised effort to collect a debt. See 
generally David A. Rice, When Bankruptcy Courts Will Enjoin State "Bad Check" Proceedings: The Decline 
of the Primary Motivation Standard in Favor if the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 93 COM. L.J. Ill (1988). 
182 It is in connection with this option that the aforementioned provisions of BAPCPA amended 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) to provide for lien retention, supra text accompanying notes 116-18, and also required that 
periodic payments be in equal monthly installments and sufficient to assure adequate protection to the holder 
of the claim during the life of the plan. See II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
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The debtor's argument, based on the plain language of the statute, would be 
that if the claim is not bifurcated under§ 506(a) because the hanging paragraph 
has rendered it inoperative, then there is no statutory basis for asserting 
entitlement to an unsecured claim for the deficiency. 183 In other words, there is 
nothing in the hanging paragraph or elsewhere in BAPCPA that says the 
treatment of the entire claim as secured is limited to circumstances where the 
debtor proposes to retain the collateral. In effect, § 1325(a)(*) operates as a 
matter of law to accomplish de facto what an undersecured creditor has the 
right to elect to do in chapter 11; that is, have the total amount of its claim, and 
not just the portion supported by value in the collateral, treated as an allowed 
secured claim for plan confirmation purposes. 184 
When the chapter 13 debtor elects to retain the collateral subject to 
§ 1325(a)(*), there is no question that the allowed secured claim for plan 
purposes is the total owed on the underlying debt. Why, the argument goes, 
should the same not be true if the debtor elects (as she is fully entitled to do) a 
different option under § 1325(a)(5)? The argument makes perfect sense under 
traditional canons of statutory construction, 185 but the appellate courts have 
roundly rejected it, suggesting that the effect of knocking § 506 out of the 
equation is not to eliminate any unsecured claim under subsection (a), but 
rather to leave the parties with their state law contractual rights and 
183 See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), for a thoughtful opinion based on this argument. 
As to § 1325(a)(*) claims, a debtor who retains the collateral must make all principal and interest payments 
under the loan agreement as they become due, and the bankruptcy court cannot adjust the payment schedule or 
impose a cramdown interest rate on the lender. The creditor, therefore, has no unsecured claim under the plan 
because the hanging paragraph, by eliminating bifurcation, has made its claim fully secured. It therefore stands 
to reason that the same analysis should apply in the case of surrender, where permitting the secured creditor's 
deficiency claim would dilute the other unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate. See II U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006). 
184 The effect of the election is that the plan must provide for payments with a present value equal to the 
full amount of the debt. See Joel L. Tabas, The § 1111 (b) Election: A Decision-Making Framework, 23 AM. 
BANKR lNST. J. 36, 36-37 (2004). Notably, if the creditor does not make the election, and receives an unsecured 
claim under § 506(a) for the amount of the debt in excess of the value of the collateral, the creditor retains its 
lien only to the extent of the allowed amount of its secured claim. !d. at 37-38. This is arguably how 
§ 1325(a)(*) should operate, rather than as under Dewsnup, where the creditor is permitted to have its cake and 
eat it, too, i.e., retention of the lien for the full amount of the debt and an unsecured claim for the deficiency if 
the collateral (net of prior liens) is valued at less than the total aruount owed. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415,417. 
185 In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369, 380 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("When an undersecured creditor seeks a 
deficiency claim against a debtor in bankruptcy, it should be emphasized that, however the deficiency might be 
calculated under state law, the creditor is seeking allowance of the deficiency as a bankruptcy claim. The 
Bankruptcy Code, and not state law, determines whether and to what extent such claim should be allowed in 
the bankruptcy estate."). 
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entitlements, including the right to a deficiency judgment, unless the loan was 
expressly made nonrecourse. 186 Curiously, some of these courts, just like the 
courts that reached precisely the opposite conclusion, also base their 
determinations on a "plain reading" of§ 1325(a)(*), 187 but they rely as well on 
the tired aphorism that state law determines the rights and obligations of the 
parties unless the Code supplies an express federal rule. 188 
What are perhaps most salient for present purposes are the negative 
implications of these decisions that permit undersecured 910 vehicle lenders to 
maintain an unsecured deficiency claim in the event of surrender of the 
collateral. Accepting these decisions on their own terms-that elimination of 
§ 506 from the equation means that the lender retains its full panoply of state 
law rights and remedies-implies ineluctably that when § 506 does apply 
(which is virtually in every other case) then its definition of when and to what 
extent a claim is secured supplants state law and controls. In the case of a lien 
unsupported by any value in the collateral beyond senior liens, § 506 defines 
the lien as an unsecured claim; thus supporting strip off in chapter 7, no less 
than in chapter 11 or 13, even in the face of Dewsnup. 
IV. WHAT DOES BEING SECURED REALLY MEAN? 
The foregoing points out that it is almost impossible to overstate the 
criticality of § 506(a) in accomplishing the policy aims of federal bankruptcy 
law. While the Supreme Court has been solicitous when it comes to treading 
186 See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Tompkins, 604 F.3d 753,757-58 (2d Cir. 2010); DaimlerChrysler 
Fin. Servs. Americas v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); 
DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Americas v. Ballard (In re Ballard), 526 F.3d 634, 638-39 (lOth Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted); Capital One Auto Fin. v. Osborn, 515 F.3d 817, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); 
In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); cf Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. 
Brown, 2013 WL 3198000, at *8-9, *11-12 (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2013) (rejecting lender's argument that the 
bankruptcy court erred in valuing a non-910 vehicle at replacement cost under § 506(a) upon surrender by 
debtor). 
187 
"Based on a plain reading of the hanging paragraph, there is no question that Congress has 
unambiguously eliminated the 910 creditor's access to a federal remedy under§ 506(a)." Tidewater Fin. Co. v. 
Kenney, 531 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2008). But see AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 
288, 297 (6th Cir. 2008) (using the common law principle of interpretation known as "the equity of the statute" 
as a method of filling statutory gaps rather than resorting to non-bankruptcy law to preserve deficiency 
claims). 
188 See In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832-33; see also infra Part IV.A. 
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upon secured creditors' state law rights, 189 even in a full priority regime, 
§ 506(a) of the Code limits the extent to which consenting parties in a 
commercial transaction can transfer risk to nonadjusting creditors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.190 Instead, the undersecured creditor is assured a 
priority claim for the value of its collateral, but, as for the balance of the debt, 
unless the Code makes specific provision to the contrary, 191 the creditor must 
feed at the trough side-by-side with all the other unsecured creditors. Likewise, 
except in specified circumstances, § 506(a): (1) maximizes the prospects for a 
debtor to confirm (and complete) a chapter 13 plan; (2) promotes equity among 
creditors inter se by providing more favorable treatment for unsecured 
creditors as a group; 192 and (3) facilitates the debtor's fresh start in chapter 
7.193 
The bifurcation of partially secured claims is certainly consistent with a 
conceptualization of security as representing a contractual right to priority and 
not a property right per se, a view to which I subscribe. 194 But, one does not 
have to endorse that ideation to appreciate how the bifurcation of claims 
pursuant to § 506(a) advances the purposive goals underlying the bankruptcy 
189 See Daniel Keating, RadLAX Revisited: A Routine Case of Statutory Interpretation or a Sub Rosa 
Preservation of Bankruptcy Law's Great Compromise?, 20 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 465, 468-69 (2012) 
(citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012)). 
190 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note I, at 864 (describing nonadjusting creditors as creditors that do not 
adjust the terms of their loan to reflect the effect on them of the creation of security interests which, under full 
priority, completely subordinate the nonadjusting creditors' claims in bankruptcy). The classic example of a 
nonadjusting creditor is a party that has been injured by the borrower and that is unable to recover fully from 
the borrower's insurance carrier. 
191 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ llll(b), 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(*) (2012). By prohibiting modification of home 
mortgage loans, the underwater mortgagee has a fully secured claim that must be paid according to the original 
terms of the contract between the parties. 
192 Even though bifurcation increases the amount of unsecured claims, the secured party takes pro rata 
with respect to its deficiency claim instead of enjoying priority over unsecured claims. This is also consistent 
with the core bankruptcy principle that equity is equality since, while secured in a state law sense, the portion 
of a claim not supported by value in collateral is much more akin in substance to an unsecured claim than a 
secured claim. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (citations omitted) (the "overriding 
consideration" in bankruptcy is that "equitable principles govern"). 
193 It does so by limiting the amount of the secured claim to the value of the collateral. Section 506(a) 
permits a debtor to retain certain property through redemption under § 722 without having to pay the entire 
amount of the underlying debt. However, since the claim must be paid in full and in cash, empirical research 
has shown, not surprisingly, that this right is infrequently exercised. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 265 (6th ed. 2009) ("For most debtors, 
section 722 might as well base redemption on the debtor running a three-minute mile."); see also II U.S.C. 
§§ 506(a), 722. 
194 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2289-92. 
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system. Except in those isolated circumstances where Congress has made the 
judgment to prohibit, or a creditor exercises its statutory option to avoid, 
bifurcation, a debt secured by collateral that is devoid of economic value 
cannot be regarded as secured in bankruptcy. 195 That is to say, once the debtor 
files for bankruptcy, the creditor that was a "secured creditor" under state law 
is now simply a creditor, the character of whose claim will be determined and 
then provided for under the Code. The distinction between types of claims, 
rather than types of creditors as under state law, is crucial to a proper 
understanding of what it means to be secured in bankruptcy. Under state law, 
the character of the claim derives from the status of the creditor, but under 
bankruptcy law and practice, the character of the claim is determinative of the 
status of the creditor. 196 
Concededly, Dewsnup cannot be fully reconciled with this view, 197 but 
Johnson and Nobelman easily can, at least as Nobelman has come to be 
construed (or tamed) by subsequent lower court decisions. 198 As the Tenth 
Circuit stated in In re Woolsey, "[Dewsnup's] definition of 'secured claim' has 
been rejected time after time elsewhere in the [C]ode .... "199 Moreover, the 
changes made to the Code under BAPCPA, and, just as importantly, the 
changes not made,200 support this construction of security, and they also 
represent, quite frankly, a powerful argument for re-examination by the 
Supreme Court or Congress of the tortured interpretation of§ 506 employed by 
the majority opinion in Dewsnup. In the meantime, there is ample basis for 
containing the damage and Congress has illuminated the path with the hanging 
paragraph by demonstrating-even if unwittingly-that § 506(a) has to be 
about more than just valuation of secured claims, in chapter 7 no less than in 
rehabilitative proceedings. 
195 See supra notes 33, 185 and accompanying text; infra note 222 and accompanying text. Collateral is 
devoid of economic value where there is no value over and above the sum of senior liens, if any. 
196 Under the Code there are no "secured parties," as creditors are not secured or unsecured; rather, it is 
claims that are secured or unsecured, by virtue of § 506, and creditors hold secured claims, which may be 
allowed or disallowed in accordance with§ 502. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. 
197 By ignoring the well-established principles of statutory construction, the Dewsnup majority concluded 
that, at least in one context, a secured claim might exist untethered to economic value. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 
U.S. 410,415-17 (1992). 
198 Unlike in Dewsnup, the Court in Nobelman acknowledged that a party cannot be a secured party unless 
it possesses a secured claim within the meaning of§ 506(a). See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
199 Woolsey v. Citibank (In re Woolsey), 696 F.2d 1266, 1276 (lOth Cir. 2012). 
200 See, e.g., Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting BAPCPA did not 
amend the Code's lien-stripping regime). 
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Returning to Dewsnup, an important part of the majority's explanation for 
assigning the phrase "allowed secured claim" a different meaning in different 
subsections of § 506 was that the prebankruptcy bargain between the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee contemplated that the lien given to secure the 
debt-the in rem claim-would remain with the property until the debt was 
paid or the lien foreclosed, regardless of what happened with respect to the 
debtor's personal liability for the debt.201 This approach is consistent with the 
standard law and economics account of bankruptcy, by now famously known 
as Thomas Jackson's "creditor's bargain model."202 Ruthlessly devoted to ex 
ante efficiency, the model posits that bankruptcy should emulate the system 
that creditors would bargain for if they were afforded the opportunity to do so, 
sans transaction costs, in advance of bankruptcy. Jackson postulates that, 
among other attributes,203 this bargain would almost obsessively respect 
prebankruptcy rights and entitlements.204 It is a view that trivializes the idea of 
substantive goals in bankruptcy, separate and apart from state law. 205 It also is 
an approach that, in pursuit of wealth maximization, largely ignores questions 
of distributive justice. In sum, it is a grim outlook that enfeebles bankruptcy 
policy and regards the bankruptcy case as little more than a procedural 
apparatus, superior to be sure to state law, but devoid of any meaningful 
. d d 1 206 m epen ent va ues. 
This account of bankruptcy has been subjected to serious criticism207 and, 
in my own view, is deeply flawed in its iconoclastic and myopic commitment 
201 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. 
202 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). For a much more complete discussion, see Lawrence Ponoroff & F. 
Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy 
Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919,948-58 (1992). 
203 Central among these are increasing wealth, by maximizing the pool of assets available to creditors, and 
minimizing strategic costs, through security and administrative efficiencies. Jackson, supra note 202, at 861. 
204 A key assumption underlying Jackson's model is that "no [ex ante] meeting of the creditors can, 
realistically, take place." !d. at 866-67. It is a key assumption because, under Jackson's account, if such a 
meeting could occur, the parties could enter the optimal ex ante agreement in an actual bargain that would 
render bankruptcy law unnecessary. 
205 See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text for a further description of the two traditional 
competing accounts of bankruptcy. 
206 See Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1399, 
1405 (2012) (pointing out that bankruptcy is ultimately "an expression of distributional norms," of which the 
wealth maximization goal of the creditors' bargain is just one). 
207 See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of 
Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problem, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 801, 804 n.l5 (1997) (and 
authorities therein cited). 
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to a single goal,208 but that is another story. The point to be made for present 
purposes is that even accepting the premise of the model, prohibiting strip off 
of liens unsupported by any equity over and above prior encumbrances 
materially re-writes the ex ante bargain in a manner that could produce a 
windfall for the lender, just as the majority in Dewsnup was concerned that 
freezing the creditor's secured claim at the judicially determined value would 
produce a potential windfall to the debtor.209 Specifically, assume the debtor 
owns a home worth $100,000 that is subject to a first mortgage in the amount 
of $120,000, and a second lien securing a debt of $25,000. Assume further that 
this debtor is able to either come up with financing to satisfy the holder of the 
first lien or work out some form of loan modification with that creditor that 
will allow the debtor to retain the property. For the strategy to work, the holder 
of the unsecured second lien must be willing to relinquish its in rem rights 
against the property. Even though those "rights" are unsupported by any value 
in the property itself, they now certainly have "hold-up" value with the 
desperate debtor.210 Is the "right" to that shakedown payment properly 
considered a bargained-for part of the deal between mortgagee and mortgagor? 
What if the otherwise junior lien is nonconsensual?211 Finally, any such 
payment from the debtor to secure the release of the lien would also seem 
certain to violate the spirit if not the letter of the discharge injunction. 212 
208 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 202, at 966-70; Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the 
Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441,451-53 (1994). 
209 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,417 (1992). The windfall could result from subsequent appreciation, 
inaccurate value, or both; see Barry Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEY. J. 1 
(1993) (positing that undervaluation must be a persistent problem); see also Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re 
Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1274 (lOth Cir. 2012) (questioning whether it would indeed be the debtor, rather 
than other unsecured creditors, who would reap the benefit of future appreciation); infra note 220. 
210 Even though it does not have, and may be unlikely to ever have, any value, the creditor has no 
incentive to release its lien unless adequately induced to do so. On the other hand, because of its lack of value, 
even a relatively small payment from the debtor, who needs to eliminate the lien if she is to keep the property, 
may be sufficient inducement. It should be pointed out that Dewsnup creates the same sort of opportunity for 
commercial terrorism with respect to a partially secured lien; i.e., to extort a payment from the debtor equal to 
N plus the equity above the prior lien(s). 
211 In other words, there is no prior bargain that strip off would interfere with, and yet no such distinction 
has been generally made in the cases. But see Howard v. Nat'! Westminster Bank (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 
644, 647 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stripping off wholly underwater judgment lien since the policy emphasized 
in Dewsnup of respecting the bargain struck by the mortgagor and the mortgagee plays no role in the case of a 
nonconsensuallien). 
212 Section 524(a)(2) of the Code contains the injunction against efforts to collect discharged debts. 11 
U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012). Payment on an in rem claim would presumably not run afoul of this provision. See 
In re Kohler, No. 10-51409-C, 2010 WL 2853893 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2010). However, when the creditor's 
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While the prospect of a windfall for the creditor, as opposed to the debtor, 
may have seemed unlikely when Dewsnup was decided in 1992, and for a time 
thereafter, since 2008 that calculus would surely have to be handicapped a little 
differently. 213 
Finally, even to the extent there is subsequent appreciation, if the debtor is 
unable to salvage the property, the likelihood of the underwater lienor actually 
realizing on that appreciation is virtually nil, since the property will almost 
surely already have been the subject of foreclosure by a prior lienor who can 
realize some economic value from its disposition. And, by operation of state 
law, that foreclosure will do exactly what Dewsnup did not allow to be done: 
eliminate the unsecured lien?14 
As a matter of state law, it is generally understood that the secured creditor 
has both an in personam claim against the debtor and an in rem claim against 
the collateral. Consistent with its pre-Code jurisprudence,215 the Court in 
Johnson held that the discharge in chapter 7 only extinguished one of those 
claims, leaving intact the in rem claim-and thus opened the door for 
modification of a previously discharged debt in a chapter 20 scenario.216 What 
Johnson failed to address, because it was not at issue, is whether the in rem 
claim persists in the absence of the very thing that constituted the "rem" to 
begin with.217 Nobelman, though a difficult decision to parse, did hold that a 
court must first look to § 506(a) for judicial valuation of the collateral to 
lien has no value, but the creditor nonetheless extracts a payment as a condition to release that lien, the 
situation comes perilously close to the line. Cf In re Anderson, 378 B.R. 296, 301 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (finding 
violation of the discharge injunction by postpetition payment on a judgment lien where the lien had not 
attached as of the date of the petition). 
213 One estimate pegged the percentage of homes underwater nationally in the last quarter of 2011 at 
22.8%. Esther Cho, Report: 22.8 Percent of U.S. Homes Are Underwater, DS NEWS (Mar. I, 2012), http:// 
www .dsnews.com/articles/percentage-of -homes-underwater -at-228-2012-03-0 I. 
214 See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
215 See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617,619 (1886): see also Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 92 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (holding that the discharge generally has no effect on an in rem claim against the 
debtor's property). 
216 This, of course, is precisely what transpired in Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 338 (4th 
Cir. 2013). See supra text accompanying notes 13(}-38. 
217 See supra note Ill and accompanying text. Surely if the collateral is no longer in existence, the claim 
cannot be regarded as 'secured" in any functional sense of the term. The situation may be different under state 
law if there is no current value to which the lien attaches because of the possibility that the value of the 
property might increase to the point where the junior lien is no longer underwater. However, in bankruptcy, the 
unique policies underlying the Code demand that these judgments be made today and not left wholly 
indeterminate into perpetuity. See infra text accompanying notes 261-67. 
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determine if the lender's claim is "secured."218 In that case, of course, there 
was value to which the bank's lien attached. Nonetheless, this formed the 
premise for later decisions holding that a wholly underwater junior lien is not 
protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2), Nobelman notwithstanding, 
because there is no "secured claim."219 
Thus, neither Johnson nor Nobelman are inconsistent with the view that 
ties the de jure meaning of secured with the de facto existence of value. 
Although § 506(d) is unquestionably applicable in all reorganization cases, the 
difference between chapter 7 and rehabilitation proceedings is, according to 
several courts,220 the existence of a specific avoiding power-one they contend 
is absent in chapter 7 since Dewnsup removed § 506(d) from the table.221 But 
phrasing the issue in this fashion misapprehends the point, as § 1322(b ), and 
for that matter § 1123(b)(5), are not avoiding powers per se. They are 
provisions that define the permissible treatment of secured claims m, 
218 See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27, 29-30 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ky. 1993) (stating that Nobelman's reference to § 506(a) is "meaningless unless some portion of the claim 
must be secured under § 506(a) analysis before the creditor is entitled to retain the rights it has under state 
law"). 
219 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
220 E.g., Laskin v. First Nat'! Bank of Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that in the absence of either a disposition of the collateral, or valuation to determine how the claim 
will be paid under chapter 11, 12, or 13, there is no basis to avoid a lien in chapter 7). The court in Laskin also 
questioned the debtor's standing to avoid a lien under § 506(a), even if such a power existed, since the only 
avoiding powers granted to debtors in the Code are under § 522(f) and (h). !d. at 874-75 (citing Eakin v. 
Beneficial Idaho, Inc. (In re Eakin), 156 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)). The court pointed out that this 
issue did not arise in Dewsnup because of the debtors' plan to redeem the property. !d. at 875. What this 
analysis overlooks, however, is that avoidance might also be used by the trustee for the benefit of the other 
unsecured creditors rather than the debtor, consistent with the strong equality norms that form the undergirding 
of the bankruptcy system. See David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1996). It also ignores the fact that an exception to the trustee's exclusive standing 
to bring an avoidance action is recognized where the transferred property would have been exempt. See James 
v. Planters Bank (In re James), 257 B.R. 673, 675 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); Ealy v. Ford Motor Credit (In re 
Ealy), 355 B.R. 685,687 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (2012)). 
221 See, e.g., Grano v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Grano), 422 B.R. 401, 403 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(noting the absence in chapter 7 of a provision parallel to § 1322(b )(2) that might support avoidance of a 
totally unsecured junior lien). In Laskin, focusing on the Dewsnup Court's interpretation of§ 506(d) as voiding 
liens securing disallowed claims, the court also noted that in a rehabilitative proceeding, such as chapter 11 or 
13, claims must be allowed or disallowed to determine who gets paid under the plan and how, but that "the 
allowance of a secured claim, or determination of secured status is meaningless in chapter 7 where the trustee 
is not disposing of the putative collateral." In re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876. And yet, § 502(a) provides that a 
claim is simply "allowed" if no party in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). Additionally, determination of the 
amount of the allowed secured under § 506 also has ramifications in chapter 7 for purposes of, inter alia, 
distribution, reaffirmation, and redemption. See generally id. §§ 546(d), 722, 726. 
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respectively, a chapter 13 and chapter 11 plan. By definition, there is no need 
for anything of that ilk in chapter 7, but neither its presence nor its absence 
ought to have any bearing on whether-and if so, to what extent-a claim is 
secured. This is a determination that, under the structure of the Code, is 
identical in all types of debtor relief chapters, and hinges on the existence of 
value in the collateral over and above the sum of all prior liens as of the time of 
filing (or disposition, although that would be quite unlikely in chapter 7, in the 
case of over-encumbered property). 222 
Left unanswered by this analysis Is, what then should happen to the 
undersecured portion of a lien in chapter 7 after the collateral has been 
abandoned or otherwise returned to the debtor and the debtor has been 
discharged from personal liability? In the case of partially secured debts, 
Dewsnup raises considerable question,223 but leaves no doubt: the lien stays 
with the property. In the case of debts "secured" by wholly underwater liens, 
the overwhelming weight of authority, including most circuit court opinions, is 
lamentably the same.224 All of this stems from the postulates set forth in 
Dewsnup: (1) under pre-Code practice, "liens passed through bankruptcy 
unaffected"; (2) post-petition appreciation belongs to the lender; and (3) first 
and foremost, the lender's rights are established under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law. Professor Howard has already demonstrated that the first 
of these propositions IS a fallacy. 225 The second Ignores that the 
222 It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of drawing the distinction between being secured under 
state law and in bankruptcy. Conceptually, a creditor that takes or acquires a lien on a used orange peel owned 
by the debtor is a secured creditor. The fact that the collateral is worthless may matter to that creditor, but is 
conceptually unimportant under state law where the creditor also maintains its in personam claim and the 
focus is on the individual debtor-creditor relationship, and not, as in bankruptcy, among the debtor's creditors 
as a group. In bankruptcy, where we are going to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the debtors pre-
and postfiling lives and treat similarly positioned creditors in a like fashion, the fact that a creditor's collateral 
has no value takes on considerable significance in terms of classifying that creditor's claim for distribution 
purposes, inasmuch as, in substance, that creditor is more like an unsecured creditor than a secured creditor 
with real collateral. See supra note 196; cf Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 783-
85 (1987) (explaining the difference in focus between state law and bankruptcy). 
223 See Woolsey v. Citibank (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1273 (lOth Cir. 2012) (describing the result 
in Dewsnup as "topsy-turvy," both as a matter of statutory construction and in terms of the rationales offered 
by the majority opinion). 
224 See supra note 83. 
225 See Howard, supra note 29, at 526-30 (pointing out that, based on the history of bankruptcy law 
before and after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it is more accurate to say that liens pass through 
bankruptcy unaffected only to the extent that the bankruptcy law does not alter the rights of secured creditors 
for the purposes of achieving equality and a fresh start); see also Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 
2266-69 (discussing the decision in In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995), to illustrate that what comes out 
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accomplishment of bankruptcy policy, whether in the liquidation or 
reorganization mode, is to draw a sharp line between the debtor's pre- and 
postpetition life. 226 The third point, which perhaps partially explains the ready 
willingness of courts to overlook the weakness of the second argument, is the 
product of a seriously flawed understanding of the relationship between state 
and federal law in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. It is that 
misunderstanding to which attention is next directed. 
A. Time to Kick Butner in the ... 
The starting place is the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Butner v. United 
States,227 the holding which, while quite prosaic and innocuous standing alone, 
has caused considerable mischief. The specific issue in Butner, leading to the 
Court's statement that determinations of property rights are generally left to 
state law,228 was whether a mortgagee's right to a security interest in 
postpetition rents should be determined under a uniform federal rule or under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Although that issue was mooted by the 1994 
amendments to the Code,229 the holding in Butner has continued to cast a long 
shadow over bankruptcy law and practice. The proposition that courts must 
look to state law to define property rights in a bankruptcy case is reflexively 
invoked and applied, including of course by the Supreme Court itself in 
defining the "rights" of a home mortgage lender immune from modification 
under § 1322(b)(2),230 without critical analysis of the very different aims of 
state debt collection law and the federal bankruptcy system.231 
of bankruptcy may bear very little resemblance to that which entered). There is also the point to be made that 
whatever pre-Code practice may have been insofar as this issue is concerned, it is a limited interpretative value 
"given that chapter 7 indubitably permits liens to be removed in many situations." In re Woolsey, 696 F.2d at 
1274 (citing Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1996) (for examples)). 
226 By definition, bankruptcy is a process designed to allow a beleaguered debtor to resolve all of his 
obligations to his creditors in a single, expedited proceeding, and a collective remedy for those creditors. These 
interests are recognized in numerous Code provisions from the definition of "claim" to the bankruptcy 
avoiding powers. See supra notes II, 178 and accompanying text; infra notes 263-{)4 and accompanying text. 
227 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
228 !d. at 54. 
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2012), which now effectively treats postpetition rents as proceeds rather 
than as after-acquired property in all cases. By contrast, the law differs from state to state in the determination 
of when a mortgagee is perfected in rents, ranging from as early as the time of recordation of the mortgage in 
some instances, to as late as the time the mortgagee takes possession of the real estate in others. 
230 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 50-55). 
231 See infra text accompanying notes 297-303. 
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For instance, as noted earlier, the Court's statement in Butner that 
"[p ]roperty interests are created and defined by state law"232 has largely 
accounted for the view taken by the appellate courts that surrender of a 910 
vehicle does not constitute a full satisfaction of the lender's claim, 233 instead of 
recognizing the existence of a federal interest calling for adoption of the 
Code's understanding of secured claims. These decisions, in my judgment, 
give insufficient attention to the limitation that the Butner Court placed on its 
holding that state law governs property rights "[u]nless some federal interest 
requires a different result. ... "234 The federal interest in this situation is either 
debtor rehabilitation or equity among creditors, inasmuch as adding the 
undersecured deficiency to the pool of unsecured claims both makes plan 
confirmation more difficult and, even when accomplished, dilutes the return to 
be received by the debtor's other unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy (and 
other) courts that regarded the exclusion of § 506 as to § 1325(a)(*) claims as 
eliminating an unsecured deficiency claim when the debtor surrenders the 
collateral, no less than when the debtor retains the property, 235 seem to have 
apprehended the importance of this limitation.236 In essence, Congress has 
enacted a statute, which the Court in Butner conceded it has the constitutional 
authority to do,237 that has made the claim in these cases "fully secured" 
without regard to which option under § 1325(a)(5) the debtor elects to use in 
her plan.238 Stated another way, when viewed from the basic objectives of the 
Code, elimination of§ 506(a) from the equation does not necessarily mean that 
the creditor retains all of the rights established by state law throughout the 
bankruptcy case and forever thereafter. To the contrary, unless and until 
232 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
233 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. 
234 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
235 See supra note 183; see also Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Kenney, 531 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the majority of bankruptcy courts have concluded that the elimination of§ 506(a) as to 910 claims means 
that creditors are without recourse to have their undersecured loans bifurcated so as to create an unsecured 
claim for the excess of the debt over the value of the collateral). 
236 See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY,§ 12.19, at 1268 (2d ed. 2009) (pointing out 
that the appellate courts' deference to state law on this issue is flawed because of the existence of a federal 
interest in favor of barring bifurcation). 
237 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (noting that Congress has authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution to fashion a rule that differs from state law). 
238 There is nothing in the wording of§ 1325(a)(*) to indicate that there is a distinction in its application 
depending on whether the debtor proposes to retain or surrender the collateral. See supra note 183 and 
accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying notes 254-58 (concerning the conceptual difference in 
bankruptcy, as compared with state law, in understanding what it means to be "secured"). 
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Congress chooses to make explicit that the interdiction on bifurcation of 910 
vehicle claims applies only when the debtor elects to retain the property, core 
bankruptcy policy dictates that these claims ought to be regarded as fully 
secured for all purposes.239 
While its judgment surely was influenced by the automobile lending lobby 
groups,240 § 1325(a)(*) can rationally only be understood as reflecting a 
congressional determination that there are sufficient policy justifications for 
prohibiting bifurcation of 910 vehicle claims despite the fact that doing so 
makes confirmation and completion of chapter 13 plans more difficult when 
the debtor wishes to keep the vehicle, and removes one of the incentives 
intended to encourage debtors to choose chapter 13 over chapter 7.241 One 
might with good reason question the wisdom of that judgment, 242 but there is 
no quarrel that these judgments are for the legislature to make. Unlike 
Nobelman, however, where the Court framed the issue in terms of the lender's 
"rights," rather than the amount of its "secured claim,"243 there can be little 
doubt that if a secured claim is immune from bifurcation under§ 506(a), then it 
is fully secured for bankruptcy purposes and should be treated as such in the 
collateral surrender scenario no less than in the retention scenario. The larger 
point to be made is that the Supreme Court's holding in Butner does not by any 
means demand that simply because a creditor's contractual and property rights 
in a bankruptcy case are initially established under state law, those rights 
cannot be altered in the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding when necessary to 
239 See supra note 185. Unlike in the case of retention, where the hanging paragraph makes confirmation 
more difficult for the debtor and decreases the dividend to unsecured creditors, in the surrender scenario it is 
principally the other unsecured creditors who pay the price of allowing the unsecured deficiency claim through 
a dilution of their claims, assuming all of the debtor's projected disposable income is already allocated to plan 
payments under§ 1325(b). 
240 See Whitford, supra note 174, at 186-87 (discussing the broad creditor coalition that collaborated 
throughout the nearly ten-year period preceding BAPCPA to achieve passage and enactment of the Act). 
241 Cf McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 614 (3d. Cir. 2000) (commenting 
on Congress' preference that debtors elect chapter 13 over chapter 7). However, with adoption in BAPCPA of 
the means test in§ 707(b) and the virtual elimination of the super discharge in§ 1328, it seems Congress has 
largely moved from carrots to sticks in influencing debtors' chapter choice. Thus, elimination of an incentive 
encouraging chapter 13 does not create the same degree of pause it may once have given. 
242 There is no shortage of criticism of BAPCPA. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim This! 
Getting Credit Seller Rights in Bankruptcy Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REv. 733, 734 (2014) (summarizing general 
criticisms of the Act); David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After the 2005 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 301 (2006) (covering changes regarding treatment of secured 
claims in chapter 13). 
243 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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advance an important federal interest.244 Allowing 910 vehicle lenders to enjoy 
an advantage regardless of whether the debtor proposes to retain or surrender 
the collateral, 245 by eliminating the unsecured claim in one instance but not the 
other, occurs at the expense of other unsecured creditors and thus compromises 
bankruptcy equality policy. An important federal interest is thus served by a 
consistent application of the treatment afforded to a claim that is sheltered 
from§ 506(a), namely, that its unsecured component has been eliminated. 
B. Postvaluation Appreciation (and Other Rhymes) 
Insofar as the Dewsnup majority's emphasis on entitlement to postpetition 
appreciation is concerned,246 the Court seems to have overlooked another 
important federal interest. That interest finds expression in the proposition, so 
critical to the contemporary bankruptcy system, that the filing of the petition 
brings the curtain down with finality on the debtor's prepetition financial 
life,247 other than with respect to those few claims that are specifically 
244 A more limiting understanding of Butner along these lines has been advanced by Professor Juliet 
Moringiello, who proposes an analysis that limits the holding in Butner regarding deference to state law to 
matters relating to bankruptcy "entry" rights (priority, status, etc.), as distinguished from bankruptcy "exit" 
rights (remedy). Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging Paragraph Story, 
2012 WIS. L. REv. 963, 988. 
Although a remedy right is a component of a property right, it is just the type of property right 
that bankruptcy law can and does alter, because allowing a secured creditor to exercise its 
remedy rights in bankruptcy would upset bankruptcy's collectivist policies. The remedy right, 
therefore, is a bankruptcy exit right and federal concerns overcome the presumption that state law 
defines property rights. 
!d.; see also Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938) (observing that it is the very nature 
of a bankruptcy proceeding to modify and adjust state property law rights); Ponoroff, supra note 242, at 789-
90 n.265 (discussing multiple circumstances where a federal interest predominates in bankruptcy to overcome 
the general presumption in Butner). But see Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 633, 691-92 (2004) (urging that when resolving state law issues, federal courts in bankruptcy 
must respect the limits on Congress's power to alter state law entitlements). 
245 It is always possible, in addition to these alternatives, to negotiate a third alternative, see supra note 
182 and accompanying text, which could easily be more beneficial to both parties than the other options, but 
transaction costs make such negotiated alternatives very rare. 
246 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 34, 178. One striking illustration of this distinction can be found in 
Judge Easterbrook's decision which dealt with whether certain transactions to build or improve airport 
facilities represented secured loans or leases for purposes of§ 365. United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., 416 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005). The determination was hinged upon whether the airline debtor would have 
to assume the leases and continue to pay the stipulated rent in order to retain possession of the facilities or 
whether it could treat the transactions, that had been denominated as leases, as secured loans so that the debtor 
would, at most, have to pay a fraction of the rent in order to continue using the facilities. Employing an old 
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excepted from this moment of financial reckoning in order to serve 
countervailing social policy objectives, or because of the debtor's opprobrious 
conduct in relation to those debts?48 This is the critical reason why, in a 
departure from prior law, Congress adopted the "broadest possible definition" 
of a "claim"249 in the Code so as to assure "that all legal obligations of the 
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be dealt with in the 
bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy 
court."250 This relief cannot be achieved with any degree of effectiveness if, 
under the rubric of Butner, courts reflexively allow all of the specified and 
unspecified attributes of a prepetition obligation to pass through the 
supposedly impenetrable barrier imposed by the filing without any critical 
analysis of whether such an exception is warranted and, even if so, whether 
benefits served by preserving that interest outweigh the important federal 
interests implicated in any bankruptcy proceeding. 
While in rem claims are not discharged per se, nothing in the Code says 
that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected?51 Thus, if the creditor receives 
firm/new firm theory for analyzing the issue of whether the payments were in return for current consumption 
or in respect of an earlier obligation, Judge Easterbrook articulated his view of reorganization under chapter 
II. !d. at 613 (citing Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Chi. Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1986)). He had 
previously used this theory in Boston & Maine Corp. and expressed his view as follows: 
Bankruptcy draws a line between the existing claims to a firm's assets and newly-arising 
claims .... If there are not enough assets to go around, some [existing] claims may be written 
down or extinguished. The ongoing operations of the business are treated entirely differently: 
new claims are paid in full as they arise. It is as if the bankruptcy process creates two separate 
firms-the pre-bankruptcy firm that pays off old claims against pre-bankruptcy assets, and the 
post -bankruptcy firm that acts as a brand new venture. 
Bos. & Me. Corp., 785 F.2d at 565. While it is bankruptcy rehabilitation policy that supports the analysis in 
chapter 11 (or 13), the fresh start policy calls for the same sort of sharp demarcation between obligations 
belonging to the debtor's pre- and postfiling life, respectively. See generally Charles J. Tabb, The Historical 
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991). 
248 These categories of debts are collected in § 523(a), which applies to individual debtors, and is now 
largely incorporated into chapter 13 by § 1328. II U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328 (2012). Certain of these exceptions 
are extended to entity debtors in chapter II and 12. !d.§§ 114l(d)(6), 1228(a)(2), 1228(c)(2). 
249 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra note 50 and accompanying text: see also Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2290-
91 ("A pivotal, although frequently unarticulated, premise of bankruptcy policy is that ... pre-filing claims 
lose their identity once a case is commenced .... [E]xcept in circumstances where strong public policy 
considerations predominate, the origin of any particular claim-whether occurred in good faith or bad, in 
contract or tort-is no longer relevant."). 
251 See supra note 225 and accompanying text: see also Howard, supra note 29, at 526 (pointing out the 
numerous instances where liens, perfectly valid under state law, are completely eliminated in chapter 7, 
rendering the creditor effectively unsecured). 
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the judicially determined value of its secured claim, the fresh start and equality 
policies in chapter 7 auger for relinquishment of the lien, 252 just as the 
rehabilitative goals in chapters 11 and 13 justify cramdown of undersecured 
claims in an individual or business reorganization. The creditor's "bargain" 
was never a perpetual encumbrance against the property until the underlying 
debt was fully satisfied. The bargain was to be able to realize on the property 
in support of payment on the debt, without regard to whether the property is 
worth more or less than the amount of the debt. This fact explains why, under 
state law, foreclosure washes the collateral free of the lien being foreclosed and 
all subordinate liens.253 The bargain was also the right to a deficiency claim 
against the borrower for the difference between the amount of the debt and the 
net proceeds from foreclosure, but the unsecured claim fashioned by § 506(a) 
recognizes and enforces that part of the bargain, except where the Code 
suspends its operation. Moreover, consistent with the egalitarian impulse that 
animates the modern bankruptcy regime, it does so by treating that claim in the 
same manner as all other prepetition unsecured obligations. 
V. WHAT BEING SECURED REALLY DOES MEAN (OR SHOULD) 
A. There Are No Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy 
In § 101 of the Code, the terms "claim" and "creditor" are defined terms of 
art; the phrase "secured creditor" is not.254 Of course, § 506(a) differentiates 
the extent to which the claim will be regarded as "secured" or "unsecured" for 
purposes of bankruptcy cases. The point to be made is that concepts of 
252 In Judge Easterbrook's terms, the balance of the debt belongs to the debtor's old life and needs to be 
"cashed out" based on whatever the dividend, if any, is for unsecured creditors. See supra note 247. In other 
words, once the creditor receives the value of the collateral, in substance, it is much more like an unsecured 
than a secured creditor, and the principle of equal treatment of like claims or equality of distribution for similar 
claims in bankruptcy demands it be treated as such. Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 
651, 655 (2006) (citations omitted) ("[W]e are mindful that the Bankruptcy Code aims, in the main, to secure 
equal distribution among creditors."). The strong-arm power in § 544(a) operates on much the same premise. 
Even though the unperfected security interest is a secured claim under state law, given the vulnerability of the 
claim to subordination to a subsequent lien creditor, the bankruptcy judgment is that the claim is more like an 
unsecured claim than a secured one, thus warranting avoidance of the lien so as to accomplish that result. In 
tum, future appreciation, if any, belongs to the "new debtor," who, as a different person, has no liability on the 
claim. 
253 See generally U.C.C. § 9-617(a) (2001) (addressing personal property). State real property law 
operates in much the same fashion, save for, typically, a period of redemption following the sale. 
254 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (10) (2012). There is no definition of "secured creditor" or "unsecured 
creditor," since that distinction hinges on the nature of the creditor's claim as determined under§ 506(a). 
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"secured" and "unsecured" for Code purposes relate to the character of the 
claims and not the status of the creditor. Thus, one can only be considered as 
having the status of "secured creditor" to the extent one has an allowed secured 
claim. The status simply does not exist under the Code separate and apart from 
the character of the creditor's claim, and that claim cannot be regarded as 
"secured" beyond the value of the underlying collateral.255 Thus, generally 
speaking, a creditor with a lien against property that has no equity over and 
above prior liens is not a "secured creditor" for bankruptcy purposes, 
regardless of the fact that the creditor holds a piece of paper granting it what 
state law calls a "security interest."256 This is all quite different from what 
being "secured" is understood to mean under state law.257 But it is different 
precisely because bifurcation is essential to the accomplishment of the goals of 
a bankruptcy proceeding separate and apart from state law. 258 
It is certainly the case that value, in addition to being innately imprecise, 259 
is subject to change. This was an important part of the holding in Dewsnup: 
that the creditors should neither be undercompensated by a conservative 
valuation nor deprived of postpetition appreciation in the property.260 But, this 
simply cannot mean that the status of a claim is forever indeterminate because 
of the inherent uncertainty associated with valuation261 or the intrinsic nature 
255 See, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (illustrating that there may be other 
advantages or protected rights associated with being secured in specific situations, but, except where the Code 
disables or permits disabling the operation of§ 506(a), a creditor's secured claim cannot exceed the value of 
the collateral, or exist in the absence of value). 
256 See In re Homes, 160 B.R. 709,715 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (citations omitted) ("The [C]ode does not 
generally classify creditors based on the existence of a piece of paper purporting to give a creditor rights in 
specific collateral, but rather on whether a creditor holds a claim supported by valuable estate property."). 
257 See Lane v. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 2002) (observing that when 
Congress separated the universe of claims into secured and unsecured, the dividing line was between those 
holding a security interest under state law and those not possessed of such an interest, but rather between the 
lienholder whose interest has some value and the lienholder whose interest is valueless). 
258 This difference is especially clear in reorganization proceedings where, without bifurcation, the cost to 
the debtor of retaining collateral would be to remain liable for all payments of principal and interest under the 
secured loan. However, while the Court in Dewsnup may have assigned the phrase "secured claim" a different 
meaning for purposes of§ 506(d), the Court did not, nor could it, say that§ 506(a) does not apply in chapter 7. 
See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 722 (determination of cost to debtor to redeem personal property collateral depends on 
valuation under§ 506(a)). 
259 See Adler, supra note 209, at 5-6 (defending Dewsnup by suggesting creditor opposition to lien-
stripping signals persistent judicial undervaluation of collateral). But see infra note 261 regarding judicial 
valuation. 
260 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,416-17 (1992). 
261 Bankruptcy judges make valuation judgments all the time. These value determinations have 
consequences ranging from whether relief from stay will be granted to whether the absolute priority rule has 
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of property to fluctuate in value.262 Presumably, the creditors in Dewsnup had 
no problem accepting their $81,000 unsecured claim, despite the potential for a 
return on their in rem claim from future appreciation in the collateral.263 
Bankruptcy, if it is to provide any meaningful relief at all to debtors, and to 
creditors as a group, demands that all prepetition obligations be accelerated, 
adjusted, and accorded the treatment called for under the Code, and that this 
occurs largely without regard to the past character of the claim or to the fact 
that circumstances may change in the future. 264 Indeed, everything is in flux, 
but it is the point of bankruptcy to draw a sharp line of demarcation, so as to 
close the books on the debtor's prepetition financiallife. 265 Decisions need to 
be made in the here and now. This is why the fact that I might be able to begin 
paying my current obligations as they come due in the future is not a basis to 
say today that grounds for involuntary relief do not exist.266 Likewise, in the 
case of relief predicated on my insolvency, 267 the possibility of a later change 
in my financial situation-after all I could win the lottery-neither changes my 
been satisfied in chapter 11. If valuation had to await the disposition of the property, the system would be 
paralyzed. See In re Homes, 160 B.R. at 716 (opining that the Code often protects, modifies, or abrogates 
important rights based on property valuations); In re Paolina, 72 B.R. 555, 557 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (Fox, 
J.) ("I cannot fathom the basis of [the argument that a lien could not be determined until the property had been 
liquidated.]"); see also Thomas J. Salerno, Jordan A. Kroop, & Craig D. Hansen, Urgent Message to the 
Supreme Court: 'Just Do It!', BCD NEWS AND COMMENT, May 25, 1999 ("[B]ankruptcy courts, as perhaps the 
most specialized commercial court[s] in the world, are uniquely qualified to make these valuation 
determinations, and have done so for years."). 
262 Yi v. Citibank (Md.), N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 398 n.l2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (citations 
omitted) ("This argument [concerning the possibility of future appreciation] also demonstrates why one cannot 
place too much reliance on the Supreme Court's statement in Dewsnup that it would not 'freeze the creditor's 
secured interest at the judicially determined valuation,' a statement that is arguably dictum .... If the status of 
various liens is not based, at least in part, on the judicially determined value, then no lien could ever be 
bifurcated under § 506(a) or avoided under § 506(d)."), abrogated by Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 
253 F.2d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001). 
263 It is unclear what impact continuation of the lien should have on the creditor's right to an unsecured 
claim. See Howard, supra note 29, at 517-18 ("Prohibition of strip down should mean that the creditors could 
not assert an unsecured claim in addition to their secured claim .... "). But see Carlson, supra note 220, at 23 
(noting that if "allowed secured claims" has different meanings in different parts of the Code, it does not 
necessarily follow that because the secured claim is for 100 percent of the debt for purposes of§ 506(d), there 
can be no unsecured deficiency based on § 506(a)). A similar issue now exists of course with respect to 
§ 1325(a)(*). See supra text accompanying notes 157-62, 221. Finally, it is also unclear who, but for 
Dewsnup, would really enjoy the benefit of future appreciation. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, 
at 2289-92. 
264 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17, at 2290-91. 
265 See supra note 226. 
266 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(l) (2012). 
267 E.g., id. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i) (concerning the avoidability of certain prepetition transfers made for less 
than reasonably equivalent value). 
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bleak financial condition at the moment nor provides a basis for withholding a 
remedy predicated on that condition. 
One of the crowning achievements of Article 9 of the UCC was to broadly 
recognize the legitimacy and enforceability of the floating lien on after-
acquired property in order to enhance the availability of credit based on 
inventory and receivables financing. 268 But Congress recognized in 1978 that if 
bankruptcy were to achieve the goal of providing debtors with a new financial 
life and maximizing returns for prepetition creditors as a group, the floating 
lien would need to be sunk with respect to most forms of non-proceeds 
property acquired by the estate after the date of the petition.269 Thus, the fact 
that a party is "secured" in a state law sense is not in itself relevant in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Instead, although a lien may owe its existence and 
character to state law, it is the Code (or its silence) that determines how that 
lien claim will be treated in bankruptcy. This is precisely what Congress did in 
2005 in order to prevent strip down of 910 vehicle loans when it eliminated 
§ 506(a) from the equation so the creditor in these situations would be deemed 
to have a secured claim for the full amount of the debt.270 In effect, the purpose 
underlying § 506(a) goes far beyond mere valuation. It is the pivotal 
determinant of not only the extent to which a claim is secured, but also whether 
a secured claim exists in the first place-not dissimilar from the way in which 
the existence of a security agreement or deed of trust serves the same function 
under state law. 
This calls into serious question the reasoning in Dewsnup that an "allowed 
secured claim" for purposes of § 506(d) does not connote a claim that is 
allowed and fully secured, but rather a "claim [that] is secured by a lien and 
has been fully allowed."271 Rectification of that unorthodox reading of the 
statute insofar as it affects partially secured liens will have to wait another 
day.272 It is not, however, necessary for that redress to occur before a lien that 
268 U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2001); see also 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
§ 11.6-.7, at 354-65 (1966) (providing history of the drafting of Article 9 and the "floating lien"). 
269 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
270 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
271 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,417 (1992). 
272 It has been suggested that the disagreement in the case law concerning strip off of unsecured liens in 
chapter 20 might provide such an opportunity. See Benjamin A. Ellison, Is it Possible that Dewsnup v. Timm 
Might Finally be Overturned? AM. BANRK. INST. J. June 2013, at 60 (suggesting that the disagreement in case 
law concerning the strip off of unsecured liens in chapter 20 might provide an opportunity for clarification). 
Still, there has yet to be a split in the courts of appeal with regard to the issue. If and when that split occurs, it 
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is wholly underwater can be stripped off even in chapter 7. This is because in 
those situations there simply is no secured claim. If there is no secured claim, 
the whole concept of a "lien" becomes a non sequitur.273 Dewsnup 
undoubtedly says that the phrase "allowed secured claim" under § 506(d) 
means something different from the use of the same phrase in § 506(a). But it 
does not say, as some courts have construed the decision,274 that § 506(a) is 
irrelevant in chapter 7.275 In order for the claim to be "secured" by anything, it 
must be supported by some value. Congress can exclude the operation of 
§ 506(a), as it has now done in the hanging paragraph, but the Supreme Court 
cannot. Thus, as long as § 506(a) continues to be operative for determining the 
character of claims based on valuation of the collateral, a claim must have 
some value in order for it to be considered "secured," whether in whole or in 
part. And if a claim is not secured at all in a bankruptcy sense, then § 506(d) 
provides that it may be voided; otherwise § 506(d) means nothing at all?76 
would be possible for the Court to resolve the matter without overturning Dewsnup, since the issue is strip off, 
not strip down. 
273 This is the basic distinction between the state law and bankruptcy meanings of the term "secured." See 
supra note 222. 
274 E.g., Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that the Supreme Court 
intended the concept of "secured" to have a specific meaning in chapter 7 rendering the valuation of the 
collateral as irrelevant). 
275 See II U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (providing that the provisions of chapters I, 3, and 5 are applicable in 
chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13). Certainly, § 506(a) applies in chapter 7 cases and remains important for other 
purposes such as determining entitlement to relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) and the amount 
necessary to redeem collateral under § 722. Thus, it might also be regarded as relevant, pursuant to the analysis 
in Nobelman, in determining if a claim is secured for purposes of application of the § 506(d) definition of 
"allowed secured claim." See supra Part I. C. If not, because the claim is wholly unsecured, strip off should be 
allowed in order to further the basic policies underlying the bankruptcy system. 
276 If Dewsnup is read to mean that under§ 506(d) a claim must be "secured" only in the state law sense 
and without regard to whether the lien is supported by any value in the collateral, then no lien supporting an 
allowed claim would ever be avoided under its strictures. Yet, the statute refers to both "allowed" and 
"secured" claims, implying they must both be given meaning. See II U.S.C. § 506(a), (d). While Dewsnup 
precludes using § 506(a) to limit the amount of a secured claim to its value, it does require that there be a 
secured claim, a question that, in order to avoid rendering specific statutory term superfluous, can only be 
answered under § 506(a). Thus, the better reading of the statute would seem to be that if the lien supporting an 
allowed claim is unsecured (as opposed to just partially secured), it is voidable. See Yi v. Citibank (Md.), N.A. 
(In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 400-Dl (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (addressing three possible attacks on the argument 
that an allowed unsecured lien is voidable); see also Michael Myers, Note, Dewsnup Strikes Again: Lien· 
Stripping of Junior Mortgages in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 1333, 1355-57 (2011) (urging 
adoption of the view that § 506(d) can be read to support strip off in chapter 7). But see David N. Saponara, 
Lien-Stripping in Consumer Bankruptcy: Debtors Cannot Strip Liens Down Partially, but Can They Strip 
Them Off Entirely? The Answer Should be No, 21 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 257 (2013) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court's policy favoring protection of secured creditor's "bargained-for" rights, suggests that no 
distinction should be drawn between strip down and strip off in chapter 7). 
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Reading § 506(a) and § 506(d) together satisfies both the policy objectives of 
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, while, at the same time, fully respecting 
property rights established under state law.277 
Unlike in chapter 11,278 there is no provision g1vmg creditors with a 
partially secured claim in a chapter 7 case the option to be treated as fully 
secured. The extent of the secured claim is not only measured by§ 506(a), it is 
defined by that provision. For all its other warts, there is nothing in the 
majority opinion in Dewsnup that alters this fundamental axiom of bankruptcy 
law. Furthermore, while of peripheral concern in the present treatment, to the 
extent that the efficiency of secured credit is justified in terms of reduced 
monitoring costs, 279 it bears noting that an approach to security that defines 
secured claims by reference to collateral value can be seen as encouraging 
more vigilant monitoring of sub-optimal debtor behavior, whether this entails 
excessive risk taking or underutilizing assets, to ensure the creditor does not 
get caught unawares with respect to any unsecured deficiency.280 
If the measure of value under § 506(a) is one dollar or greater, then a 
secured claim exists to such extent and Dewsnup's interpretation of§ 506(d) is 
that the lien remains with the property even after the in personam claim has 
been discharged-although it is difficult to imagine what purpose this serves 
other than to frustrate the debtor's fresh start without any corresponding social 
utility. 281 One the other hand, if the measure of value is zero, a determination 
277 See Keating, supra note 189, at 468, 512-15 (identifying what he regards as the Supreme Court's 
reluctance, often cloaked in the rationale of strict statutory construction, to impair or diminish the rights of 
secured creditors in bankruptcy). 
278 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
279 E.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1050-51 (stating that the existence of collateral is likely to 
reduce monitoring costs); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 
YALE L.J. 49, 50-59 (1982) (arguing that secured credit induces efficient levels of monitoring because it 
addresses freeriding considerations); cf Daniel Heme!, Note, The Economic Logic of the Lease/Loan 
Distinction, 120 YALE L.J. 1492, 1521-22 (2011) (noting that because of the impact of bifurcation under 
§ 506(a), "the secured creditor will presumably devote more efforts toward monitoring the widget-maker's 
asset use," although other costs undercut the extent that the secured creditor, unlike a lessor, can at least recoup 
some of this "depreciation loss" in the form of the dividend on its unsecured claim). See generally Squire, 
supra note 6, at 850-53 (summarizing and critiquing prior monitoring theories). 
280 Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An 
Empirical Analysis, 57 DuKE L.J. 1037, 1049-50 (2008) (commenting on the ability of secured creditors to 
monitor debtors and threaten foreclosure on assets if a debtor engages in risk-altering behavior, underinvests to 
maximize its own profits at the expense of a joint venturer, or threatens opportunistic default). 
281 That is, in the sense that it is unrealistic to think that the creditor whose lien has no value as of the time 
of filing is likely to ever see any return from the property. See supra note 214; infra note 319. 
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h h dl . 282 h h . d 1 . 283 A h t at ar y goes on m secret, t en t ere 1s no secure c mm. t t at 
juncture, the lien is an unnecessary excrescence that should be amendable to 
strip off, if not under the language of§ 506(d) (which after all does refer to a 
lien that secures a claim) then conceptually as a matter of the inherent powers 
of the bankruptcy courts to go beyond the literal text of the Code to fashion a 
rule when necessary to serve a uniquely federal interest. 284 And, the point to be 
made is that Dewsnup does not bar this outcome285 any more than Nobelman 
precludes strip off in chapter 13 or 20.286 
B. Are the Supremes the Only Court That Can Sing in Motown? 
As observed earlier, the absence of a specific source of statutory authority, 
as exists in reorganization proceedings, for avoiding an unsecured lien in 
chapter 7 has been a stumbling block for many courts.287 Most of the courts of 
appeal to have addressed the question of strip off in chapter 7288 have rejected 
the suggestion that § 506(d) can provide the necessary authority in light of the 
meaning ascribed to that provision by the majority opinion in Dewsnup. 289 The 
argument, I would maintain, is worthy of reconsideration in those courts, or, 
more realistically, in the appeals courts yet to address the issue,290 in light of 
282 Often overlooked in the rush to criticize judicial valuations is. as the court pointed out in Yi. the fact 
that the creditor has every opportunity to appear and challenge the valuation of the property submitted by the 
debtor. Yi v. Citibank (Md.). N.A. (In re Yi). 219 B.R. 394. 401 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). Thus. the court 
observed that an injury suffered as a result of the judicially determined valuation. would be a "self-inflicted 
wound."" !d. 
283 !d. at 400 (explaining how and why the difference between a lien being secured and unsecured can 
hinge of one dollar). 
284 See Woolsey v. Citibank. N.A. (In re Woolsey). 696 F.3d 1266. 1274 (lOth Cir. 2012) (noting that 
chapter 7 "indubitably"" permits liens to be removed in many situations); infra notes 294-308 and 
accompanying text (discussing the creation and application of common law bankruptcy. including non-literal 
judicial interpretation of statutory language for the purpose of furthering a federal interest). 
285 The majority opinion in Dewsnup holds that§ 506(d) cannot be used to void the unsecured portion of a 
lien as defined under§ 506(a); it does not hold that such a lien is impervious to avoidance by other means in a 
proper case. such as when it is wholly underwater. Dewsnup v. Timm. 502 U.S. 410.417 (1992). 
286 See supra Part III. C. 
287 See supra notes 220--21 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra Part ILB. 
289 E.g .• In re Woolsey. 696 F.3d at 1278 ("Dewsnup may be a gnarled bramble blocking what should be 
an open path. But it is one only the Supreme Court and Congress have the power to clear away.""). 
290 This list arguably includes the Eleventh Circuit which. as noted earlier. has. as of this writing. ruled in 
favor of strip off in Chapter 7 in an opinion that. while now published. is not yet final. See supra notes 100--04 
and accompanying text. 
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analysis set forth above.291 Failing that, however, and recogmzmg the 
widespread dissatisfaction with Dewsnup even in the courts that dutifully 
uphold it,292 the challenge becomes to find another alternative. 
Recent scholarship and case law have fairly called into question the extent 
to which it might be defensible to press the bankruptcy courts' equitable 
powers under § 105(a) into service for this purpose293 and the degree to which 
bankruptcy judges generally may employ nonstatutory equitable principles to 
support an outcome not expressly countenanced by the Code?94 Yet, a quite 
serviceable alternative may be found in an analysis that is not only plausible in 
formulation, but that also already has a long and proven (albeit sub silentio) 
track record in bankruptcy. 295 Several years ago, Professor Adam Levitin 
published an intriguing article addressing the difficult question of how to 
291 An ancillary benefit of adoption of this analysis by a court of appeals would be to create a split in the 
circuits that might offer then the opportunity for the Supreme Court either to articulate the scope of its holding 
in Dewsnup or reconsider it in its entirety. It has been suggested that the disagreement in the case law 
regarding strip off in chapter 20 might offer that occasion. See Ellison, supra note 272, at 61. But it would be 
easy for the Court to duck direct confrontation with Dewsnup simply by relying on its precedents in Johnson 
and Nobelman. 
292 E.g., In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d 1266; Wachovia Mortg. v. Smoot, 478 B.R. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re 
Cook, 432 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010). 
293 The scope of the bankruptcy courts' exercise of equitable powers under the expansive language of 
§ 105(a) has been constrained by the requirement that the § 105(a) powers be exercised only within the 
confines of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. N.A. v. Sommers (In re Amco Ins.), 444 
F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Section 105(a) 'does not permit courts to act as roving commissions to do 
equity."') (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. (In re Mirant 
Corp.), 378 F.3d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 2004)); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the power conferred by§ 105(a) is the power "to implement rather than override," and certainly not to ignore 
Code rules). 
294 See Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of 
Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. I, 21-28 (2005) (tracing the history of the bankruptcy 
courts' equity powers through the Supreme Court holding unconstitutional § 241 of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, which granted the bankruptcy courts "the powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty," and 
concluding that under the Code, the bankruptcy court lacks these full powers of a court of equity). 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1481 (1982) would have given the bankruptcy courts the same equity powers that the courts enjoyed under 
§ 2 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898 (30 Stat. 544). Its implementation, however, was delayed by the 
Supreme Court's decision holding the 1978 Act's jurisdictional scheme unconstitutional inN. Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). It eventually went into effect two years later, but only 
days thereafter was effectively abrogated by the legislation promulgated in response to Marathon, the 
Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act, 98 Pub. L. No. 353, 98 Stat. 345 (1984). See Ahart, supra, 
at 21-23. 
295 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a 
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. I, 84 (2006) ("[F]ederal common lawmaking is what federal courts 
have been doing in bankruptcy for over a century."). 
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reconcile equity with a code-based regime like bankruptcy.296 Seeking, inter 
alia, to mediate between the narrow, what he terms "proceduralist," view of 
bankruptcy297 and the more expansive "practicalist" account that regards the 
bankruptcy system as advancing independent and unique substantive goals 
separate and apart from state commercial law,298 Professor Levitin has 
identified a methodological construct for identifying when and how the 
bankruptcy courts participate in lawmaking under the Code.299 He associates, 
quite rightly, the proceduralists with a view that envisages the judicial function 
in bankruptcy as largely administrative in nature,300 with bankruptcy judges 
passively applying clear legal rules in a consistent and predictable fashion, 
even if at the expense of particularized justice in individual cases?01 By 
contrast, he describes the practicalists as placing an emphasis on the flexibility 
necessary to carry out bankruptcy policy, and, thus, as advocating the need for 
bankruptcy judges to possess and exercise broad discretion to adopt and apply 
non-Code practices when necessary to achieve the desideratum of the 
296 !d. (arguing that the role of courts in developing non-Code practices in bankruptcy is better defined as 
federal common lawmaking rather than as acting as a court of "equity"). The issue is, of course, yet another 
variation on the long-standing debate between rules and standards, certainty and fairness, and formalism and 
realism. The classic work on this subject probably remains Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). 
297 Levitin, supra note 295, at 4-5 (indentifying practicalists as those who desire broad discretion for the 
bankruptcy judges to implement bankruptcy policy and proceduralists as favoring clear rules over judicial 
discretion and generally associated with the law and economics branch of legal theory); see also Jackson, 
supra note 202, at 857 (discussing the "creditors' bargain" model, which reflects the proceduralist point of 
view); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 202, at 948-55 (also discussing the "creditor's bargain," but 
utilizing the rubric of collectivist/traditionalist). 
298 The distinction between these two camps was also described by Professor Knippenberg and me under 
the rubric of "collectivists" and "traditionalists." Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 202, at 948-66. 
299 Levitin, supra note 295, at 84 ("[A] common law approach also presents more predictable application 
of judicial discretion making it possible for parties to factor in legal regimes into their behavior [ex ante], as 
the proceduralists would like."). Professor Levitin's focus is on reorganization in chapter II, but there is 
nothing in his federal common law justification for the creation of extra-Code rights practices that is limited to 
reorganization; rather it is animated by the need to achieve underlying bankruptcy policy through judicial 
flexibility, but a flexibility that is executed in a manner that represents a "more predictable application of 
judicial discretion making it possible for parties to factor in legal regimes into their behavior ex ante, as the 
proceduralists would like." !d. at 86. 
300 See also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy 
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REv. 384 (2012) (suggesting the benefits of shifting away from a court-centered 
model of bankruptcy to an administrative model overseen through a regulatory agency). 
301 Levitin, supra note 295, at 5 (describing the proceduralist view as emphasizing the rule of law and 
regarding judicial adoption of non-Code practices as representing "unnecessary, overreaching, and even 
harmful displays of judicial discretion and activism"). 
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bankruptcy regime. 302 This would include, when and as necessary, the 
discretion to develop rules that operate to augment the letter of the Code, as 
well as to expand and develop practices in the statutory interstices and perhaps 
even around the edges?03 
The happy medium offered by Professor Levitin is to explicitly recognize 
that the use of federal common law offers a valuable alternative framework for 
understanding and analyzing the undeniable reality of non-Code practices, and 
as a means to both permit and regulate expansion of the law beyond the four 
comers of the Code?04 He describes this approach as dependent on precedent 
and judicially-devised tests such that it simultaneously constrains the unbridled 
discretion that is the great fear of the proceduralist, and yet satisfies the 
practicalist by investing bankruptcy judges with the measured discretion to 
digress from the rigid letter of the Code when necessary to ensure that the 
larger goals of the system are served and promoted?05 Notably, Professor 
Levitin does not claim to have invented this approach as much as having 
revealed it, as he describes federal common lawmaking in bankruptcy as being 
"what federal courts in bankruptcy have been doing for over a century."306 
302 !d. at 4-5 (referring to practicalists as holding the view that bankruptcy has distinctive substantive 
goals that call at times for the alteration of state law rights and a deviation from the statutory text-and the rule 
of law-when necessary to advance the purposes of the law). 
303 !d. at 1-2 (offering example practices in chapter II that are not explicitly authorized in the Code, such 
as critical vendor orders, substantive consolidation, and discharge or release of non-debtor affiliates of the 
debtor). 
304 !d. at 67 (2006) (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1947) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a federal common law does exist in certain specific areas when 
necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest and when authorized by Congress, even after the Court's 
landmark holding in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that there is no general federal common 
law). It is important to note for purposes of the present analysis that Professor Levitin's treatment of the 
subject focuses on the relationship between Congress and the courts in bankruptcy matters, and does not 
purport to address the relationship of federal and state law. !d. at 3 n.ll. It is submitted, however, that this 
framework for analysis has the potential to say a great deal about that relationship, inasmuch as the bankruptcy 
power is exclusively federal and constitutional in origin, and the test of when a state law right may be altered is 
when it is necessary to serve an important federal interest. See supra text accompanying note 208. Thus, while 
it may be that a "uniquely" and an "important" federal interest are not entirely coincident, the same 
considerations that permit development of a federal common law in specific areas may also apply in 
determining the federalism-related issues. 
305 Levitin, supra note 295, at 3 ("The rule of law wins but a Pyrrhic victory when it defeats the purpose 
of the law."); see also id. at 81 (2006) (noting that the extremely fact-specific nature along with the structure of 
the bankruptcy system requires flexibility and discretion). 
306 !d. at 84 (2006); see also Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 
Nw. UNIV. L. REv. 585 (2006) (suggesting undue state bias as an additional basis for the rule of decision to be 
guided by federal common law). 
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Professor Levitin finds the sources of authority to create and apply a federal 
common law of bankruptcy as (1) deriving from the need to protect a uniquely 
federal interest as established by the uniformity provision in the Bankruptcy 
Clause of the Constitution, and (2) implicitly authorized by Congress in the 
Code, the legislative history to the Code, Congress' acquiescence in the pre-
Code practices doctrine, and in the practical necessities of bankruptcy 
. 307 practice. 
If the courts, and particularly the courts of appeal, cannot be persuaded for 
the reasons that have been advanced by this article, and in some of the 
decisionallaw,308 to draw a distinction between strip down and strip off under 
§ 506(d), then the power to void worthless junior liens might be found to exist 
as a matter of the courts' authority in bankruptcy to craft a federal rule of 
decision when necessary to advance unique bankruptcy polices, such as the 
fresh start. Even accepting a federal common law in bankruptcy, however, it 
needs to be emphasized that reaching the conclusion that the power to strip off 
unsecured liens exists absent specific statutory stricture requires not only 
accepting a bankruptcy understanding of the meaning of "secured," rather than 
the orthodox state law meaning (Butner notwithstanding), but also that such a 
result is not barred by the specific holding in Dewsnup. As has hopefully 
already been demonstrated, both of these conditions are satisfied,309 such that 
an avenue is opened for those courts that seek a clear and principled path for 
further limiting Dewsnup even more narrowly to its facts. 
It bears mentioning as well, despite the implication to the contrary in 
Dewsnup,310 there is no constitutional impediment to this conclusion because, 
307 Professor Levitin cites the Supreme Court's determination in Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz. 546 U.S. 
356 (2006). that bankruptcy was an important enough federal interest to warrant subordination of state 
sovereign immunity as illustrative of the importance of the former; he cites Congress's decision to place 
bankruptcy proceedings in courts. rather than an agency. as evidence of the latter. Levitin. supra note 295. at 
71-77. 
308 See supra note 82. 
309 See supra Part VLA. 
310 The majority opinion in Dewsnup cited an earlier Supreme Court case which had invalidated under the 
Takings Clause the provisions of the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1934. Dewsnup v. Timm. 502 
U.S. 410.419 (1992) (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford. 295 U.S. 555 (1935)). That Act had 
originally permitted reduction of a creditor's lien. Thus. the reference to Radford in Dewsnup implied that any 
interpretation of§ 506(d) which reduced the amount of a lien for any reason other than payment on the debt 
might similarly be constitutionally infirm. 
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in fact, nothing is being taken,311 and, in any case, it is well established that 
lien avoidance under the federal bankruptcy power "does not come within the 
traditional definitions of taking under the Fifth Amendment."312 The 
accommodation of the tenuous balance between a creditor's interests in 
property and the debtor's (and society's) interest in the fresh start is abundantly 
clear. You are either secured in a state law sense-with all that entails-or, in 
a bankruptcy sense-with all of its corresponding consequences. There is no 
rationale for allowing the creditor with a lien against property of the debtor to 
assert both an unsecured claim with respect to its deficiency, and retention of 
its in rem claim to support the full amount of the debt, although that is 
precisely what the majority opinion in Dewsnup permits to occur in the case of 
a partially secured claim. However, neither Dewsnup nor the language and 
structural logic of the Code require that this be so in the case of wholly 
unsecured liens. Except when the Code instructs or, as in the case of § 1111 (b), 
permits, a claim to be insulated from bifurcation, a secured claim in 
bankruptcy requires that there be at least some value that attaches to the lien at 
the time of filing. Otherwise, not only is the lien unsecured, but the creditor is 
unsecured, regardless of the fact that it holds a piece of paper that says 
otherwise. When the Code makes § 506 inapplicable, or permits a creditor to 
render bifurcation ineffective, the result is that the entire claim is treated as 
secured (as under state law), but what then happens to the claim is a 
bankruptcy, not a state law, question.313 The decision of Congress in BAPCPA 
311 Professor Howard has ably debunked this argument by pointing out, among other things, that once the 
Frazier-Lemke Act was amended, renamed as the Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1935, to apply only 
prospectively and assure the creditor the value of its collateral, the Court in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the 
Mountain Trust Bank, 300 US 440 (1937), rejected any constitutional challenge. See Howard, supra note 29, at 
525. Professor Howard also pointed to the Court's decision in United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 
( 1982), upholding the constitutionality of the lien avoidance power in § 522(f) as applied prospectively. !d. 
312 See Pillow v. Avco Fin. Servs. (In re Pillow), 8 B.R. 404, 411 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (indicating that 
exercise of the federal bankruptcy power to avoid liens, "does not come within the traditional definitions of 
taking under the Fifth Amendment"); see also Yi v. Citibank (Md.), N.A. (In re Yi), 219 B.R. 394, 401-02 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (summarizing the same argument). 
313 See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 518 (1938). Justice Cardozo stated in 
summation: 
Property rights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the bankruptcy court because created and 
protected by state law. Most property rights are so created and protected. But if Congress is 
acting within its bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to affect these property 
rights, provided the limitations of the due process clause are observed. 
!d. The same can be said when the courts exercise their limited, but proper lawmaking role in 
bankruptcy. 
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to prevent cramdown of purchase money auto loans by disabling § 506 as to 
these claims demonstrates the pivotal role of§ 506(a) in defining the existence 
vel non, as well as the amount, of a secured claim? 14 Thus, the decisions that 
prohibit strip off of valueless liens in chapter 7, just as the decisions that permit 
resurrection of an unsecured deficiency claim when a debtor proposes to 
surrender § 1325(a)(*) collateral, misapprehend what it means, and what it 
does not mean, to be "secured" in bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
Over 16 years ago, Professor Knippenberg and I attempted to offer a 
solution to the long-standing puzzle of how to negotiate a reconciliation 
between what we termed the immovable object and the irresistible force? 15 
Much has happened since that time, but the inherent tension between 
bankruptcy's fresh start and rehabilitation policies, on the one hand, and the 
state law rights and remedies of secured debt on the other, persists. To a 
degree, this is inevitable because the two systems seek to achieve largely 
antithetical goals, and there is no perfect balance between the two-just 
judgments about where to place the normative stanchion. 
In the case of lien stripping, it has been my suggestion that one profitable 
way to approach the issue is by reaching some modus vivendi on the question 
of how to conceptualize the security interest in bankruptcy. In this respect, the 
Code points the way in § 506(a), which not only limits the amount of a secured 
claim to the value of the collateral available to the lien, but determines if a 
secured claim exists at all. The counterargument is that this approach deprives 
the secured party of other essential aspects of its bargain with the debtor, most 
importantly, the right to foreclose? 16 It has also been submitted that because of 
the innate subjectivity of judicial valuations, this understanding of security 
cames a high risk of depriving the secured creditor of current or future 
value?17 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 175-77. 
315 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 17. 
316 This is the pivotal distinction between strip down and strip off. If there is no secured claim at all, then 
Dewsnup's prohibition based on its interpretation of§ 506(d) as applying to "secured" in a state law sense, 
does not apply. 
317 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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I have attempted to demonstrate that the first concern is unfounded because 
the economic advantages of security beyond the value of the collateral are 
largely ephemeral. As to the latter argument, not only does the distrust of 
judicial valuations lack empirical substantiation, but, given the depressed 
prices associated with forced sales, there is reason to suppose that creditors 
may actually realize more from their collateral inside rather than outside 
bankruptcy. This is particularly true in the circumstances where the Code now 
insists on replacement cost valuation? 18 Insofar as future appreciation is 
concerned, not only is that prospect not assured, even in the case of real 
property collateral-as we have learned in recent years-but it is unlikely to be 
realized unless the junior secured creditor is prepared to pay cash to buy out 
the prior lien, become the long-term owner of a nonproductive asset, and then 
await a better market. It is improbable, to say the least, that the professional 
lending community would have much interest in such a course of action? 19 
Moreover, the argument ignores altogether the crucial fact that bankruptcy at 
its essence requires the final toting up and close out of prepetition claims in 
order to achieve parity among similarly positioned creditors and to provide 
relief to debtors in both the liquidation and reorganization contexts?20 
It should be stressed that these issues about the characterization of secured 
debt are not simply creditor versus debtor issues, which are of course the 
fashion in which state law apprehends the rights associated with security. 
Bankruptcy is also a collectivized debt collection procedure designed to 
maximize returns for creditors as a group, but this sometimes comes at the 
expense of a single creditor. A conceptualization of security that insists on 
minimizing to the point of triviality the infringement on state law rights also 
undermines this goal of the system, usually to very little avail. While the 
Supreme Court's limited lien-stripping jurisprudence has undoubtedly been 
chary when it comes to upsetting the state law remedies of secured creditors,321 
318 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012) (superseding in part the Supreme Court's decision in Assocs. 
Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)). 
319 See supra note 76; see also Myers, supra note 276, at 1356 (pointing out that the concern over future 
increase in value is specious in that most lienholders are not in the business of property management nor in a 
position to hold underwater real properties to see if the market will recover). 
320 See supra text accompanying notes 178, 247-52. 
321 See generally Keating, supra note 189. 
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the Court has not been oblivious to the rights of debtors nor to creditors as a 
. h b kru 322 group m t e an ptcy process. 
The jurisprudence that has developed in the lower courts since Dewsnup in 
relation to lien stripping, including most recently the Fourth Circuit's decision 
in Branigan v. Davis, is generally consistent with the account of security 
advanced here and is most readily apparent in the case of strip off. The glaring 
exception is strip off in chapter 7, a product, it would seem, of an overly broad 
reading of Dewsnup, and perhaps a wariness born from the absence of a 
specific cramdown mechanism in chapter 7. Whatever the rationale, as has 
been shown, this reading of Dewsnup ignores the primacy of§ 506(a) and the 
criticality of claim bifurcation to the accomplishment of the key objectives of 
bankruptcy: equality among similarly-placed creditors and a fresh start for 
debtors. Strip off, however, does not hinge on the availability of a statutory 
mechanism for cramming down claims. Rather, it is a function of the 
determination of whether or not the claim, as opposed to the claimant, is 
secured.323 In the case of a wholly underwater lien, the creditor decidedly does 
not hold a secured claim, and avoidance of the lien is, therefore, either 
authorized by the statute324 or is left to the discretion of judges to make 
appropriate public policy decisions to achieve the basic objectives of 
bankruptcy?25 Strip off is also consistent with a proper view of the meaning of 
security in bankruptcy. 
Recent amendments to the Code, despite their overall creditor-friendly 
orientation, actually support this analysis. 326 Dewsnup, on the other hand, does 
not. While I believe the majority holding in Dewsnup is more than worthy of 
reconsideration, it is maintained that, properly understood, there is nothing in 
that holding that precludes strip off, as opposed to strip down. The courts 
should thus take their proper role in the development of such a rule in the 
traditional common law style, leaving Dewsnup a curious aberration whose 
322 See, e.g., Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991) (upholding the ability to modify a secured 
creditor's claim in chapter 20); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Inc. (In re Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs., Inc.), 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (denying a secured lender adequate protection for its lost 
opportunity costs); see also supra note 37; Howard, supra note 29, at 530 (reasoning that the suggestion in 
Dewsnup that in rem rights are unaffected by bankruptcy is inconsistent with the Court's holding in Timbers 
denying a secured creditor's claim for protection of its lost opportunity cost). 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 254-58. 
324 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra note 305. 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 174-77. 
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precedential value is narrowly confined to the specific facts and circumstances 
of that case. The bankruptcy system and its participants would all benefit from 
both this limited reading of Dewsnup and from a fixed and enduring 
understanding of the nature of secured claims in bankruptcy. 

